Who Would BUY a Chevy Volt?

Who In Their Right Mind Would BUY a Chevy VOLT?

After all, it’s $40K – think about what else one can buy for $40K! There are very nice Lexus, Benz, Infiniti, BMW, and Cadillac models in that price range. AND even with a government subsidy it doesn't stand on its own at $40K. Even if gas hits $5, it doesn't work. Plus who knows what it will be worth in 39 months, or 36 or 48 for that matter. If new technology trumps it, it could be next to worthless. Why take the risk just to be known as an "early adopter?" That's why Bob Lutz, the Father of the VOLT, told us at a fleet conference a while back, "It won't SELL. That's why we're leasing them for $350/month for 39 months."

Lutz says, "We gotta start somewhere if we EVER plan on achieving economies of scale." In true Lutz fashion he compared the VOLT to hunting ducks. "If you shoot at the duck, you will miss it every time. One has to "lead" the duck to hit it. We need to lead the market to have a chance to hit it. If we wait too long, the train has left the station and we are standing on the platform saying, "What happened?"

"Lead, follow, or get out of the way, said Lee Iaccoca. Lutz concurs.

Toyota lost money on every PRIUS beginning in 1996, and did for quite a while. That vehicle is thought to be profitable these days, although they are typically "tight lipped "on such matters. Toyota is now bringing a plug in hybrid to market. (The VOLT was the world’s first plug in hybrid.) Toyota has lots of experience and satisfied hybrid customers now, along with economies of scale.

In the meantime, the VOLT has attracted detractors. The Right Wing in the person of Rush Limbaugh has embraced the VOLT as a car they can hang around the President's neck, despite the fact it had been in development long before he was elected. Actually, Lutz IS the actual "Father of the VOLT." For Lutz to get after the Right Wing takes some doing -- see his Forbe article.

The barrage of untruths continue. A friend from told me that it would take 3 weeks to drive across the country in a VOLT with all the stops to recharge. He said heard it on Right Wing talk radio. In fact, the electric range on VOLT is about 45 miles before the internal combustion engine takes over to propel one across the country as with a normal car. It IS true that the internal combustion engine recharges the batteries which drives the electric motors rather than being actually connected to the drive train in a conventional manner. But to the driver, the difference is not noticeable except the engine doesn’t change RPM based on throttle position.

Others claim they catch fire in a collision. The VOLTs that caught fire had been crash tested and stored improperly for weeks before they caught fire. A vehicle with a regular lead acid battery stands the same risk if stored improperly. As with normal vehicles, the battery should have been removed.

A driver with a less than 30 minute commute to work, and a place to plug in while there, could drive all month without the internal combustion engine using any fuel at all. Figuring 50 miles per day plus other driving, one saves two tanks of fuel per month or about $120. Subtract that from the $350 lease payment and the VOLT can be easily justified. BUT GM has NOT made that case. Worse yet, sales people in Chevy dealerships haven't either. And coupled with the Right Wing misinformation blitz, GM has shut down production for 5 weeks to balance inventories. In my mind, the story has been that GM has not done the math for consumers in their marketing efforts. The marketing story is "$350 minus $120 equals $230./month. That WORKS!!!!!

[Smitka: But obviously consumers don't do the math -- ditto with the Prius, as there's no strong case for buying it on the basis of fuel savings, which is why no other hybrid, including those made by Toyota, sell well. In other words, people buy a Prius to make a statement – hence you don't find "base" models on the lot, the main reason Toyota may make money on the vehicle, despite the cost of installing two powertrains plus a battery pack. GM needs to borrow a bit of that marketing. At the moment, of course, so does Toyota....]

David Ruggles, April 17, 2012

Lights Turned Off at Bright Automotive

...new technology can't target the mass market...

The long-run goal for electric vehicles is the mass market. The expense of new technology means that is not the place to start. Instead, there are two alternatives. One is to target the high end of the luxury segment; that is Tesla's strategy. It's not clear, however, that that market is sufficiently large for two firms to survive, and the second – Fisker – is late to market. Others, such as Aptera, wanted to turn out a (very) small vehicle and charge a (super) premium price for it. The vehicle itself would certainly have attracted attention. But the very rich insist on luxury as part of the package, and a tiny car can't deliver that.

The other option is to target a market that is particularly sensitive to fuel efficiency: commercial fleets. That was the strategy of Bright Automotive. Vehicles for (say) UPS in an urban area are on the road all day, with fuel a significant operating cost. But they're not on the road at night, and they may not travel long distances, only long hours. The space and weight of batteries is less of a constraint; there's no chicken-and-egg issue of whether there are enough recharging stations, because they are only needed at the corporate garage. And it's possible to create a value proposition, that the gains in efficiency will offset the higher up-front capital costs. Car purchasers aren't particularly good at that sort of calculation, focusing on "first cost" (purchase price) and not life-of-vehicle costs.

Bright in fact was able to attract purchase commitments from customers on the basis of actual vehicle cost and performance specs. What they needed was capital, in order to fund the nitty-gritty up-front costs of engineering and testing / regulatory approval, and to provide operating capital to let them produce vehicles – they would have to pay workers and capital equipment suppliers and (depending on their bargaining skills) suppliers of parts and components before they were able to deliver their first vehicle and build their revenue stream. And unlike the "supercar" entrants they were looking at production at a relatively high volume; they couldn't accomplish that on a shoe-string, taking the money from the first vehicle they shipped to pay for the parts for the second one. In other words, they intended to be a viable, volume operation, in it to earn a tidy profit on an ongoing basis. But to be a real company in the auto industry takes a lot of resources.

Reuben Munger, the founder, is a W&L econ grad, but that alone isn't enough to impress me, except that he was an exceptionally good student. Reuben is also a former investment banker, and had "skin in the game." Another notch in his favor. We were able to bring him to campus; he met with some of us faculty privately, and gave presentations to our students. What he said made sense, and I'm a hard sell, as I've sat through a lot of presentations of the business case for innovations in the automotive sector.

From the beginning those involved with Bright understood the venture to be risky. However, they were able to raise initial capital for the R&D part of the venture – including from General Motors – because there would be money available for working capital from the Department of Energy loan program.

Unfortunately, that loan program seems to have unofficially closed its doors. The undercurrent in media reports is that it is a victim of the election campaign, where the loans are being tarred by the failure of Solyndra. (See stories in the Washington Post and in Automotive News.) I also wonder if those involved at the Department of Energy were fixated on passenger vehicles; unless you know something of the industry, selling trucks to Snap-On doesn't sound sexy or central to US energy policy.

I've encountered that mindset, even among people with some real grounding in the auto industry, who ought to know better. But then I've benefited from serving as a judge for the Automotive News PACE supplier innovation competition [link], where I've heard the business case for innovations with target markets across the industry, from machine tool and test equipment suppliers, to suppliers of (not-so-generic) materials, to suppliers of components specific to the long-haul "semi" market, to suppliers to the aftermarket (replacement parts), and suppliers to dealers, as well as the "traditional" Tier I suppliers of parts that go into high-volume passenger cars.

One of the hurdles for a firm to win a PACE award is that they show a credible customer has purchased their innovation and has it in use, on the road. And often one customer isn't enough. So when I learned that a number of hard-nosed customers had signed up (I know a bit about one of them, Snap-On), well, I thought Bright should be a slam-dunk. Too bad, because the US needs firms like Bright.

Mike Smitka, Prof of Economics
Washington and Lee University

Toyota vs GM: Guess Who's the Dinosaur!

...economic theory says dominant firms adopt strategies that undermine their dominance ...

This isn't an enthusiast site, and I'm not a car guy. My family didn't have a second car growing up so tinkering with one never became a hobby. My attitude is horribly utilitarian: a car's function is to get me from point A to point B. So my own vehicle is 24 years old, my secondary one is 14 years old (while my wife's is only 8 years old). When I go on long trips I try to rent a car. And when I visit auto suppliers as a PACE judge or otherwise do the limited travel in which a normal academic engages, I also rent cars.

That said, I have written on this blog about the logic of a leading firm to "never be first" (in its heyday this was the case at GM, and in the past two decades became an operating motif at Toyota). Furthermore, there is an internal bureaucrat logic at large companies. I've not interviewed people about this, so I'm not being my normal careful academic self in stating it, but I surmise that if you're an ambitious engineer / designer / marketer at Toyota, you wanted to be associated with the Scion (Akio Toyoda's pet project) and with Lexus (prestige and profits). To work on the Camry would be a ho-hum posting. You wouldn't be using it as a platform to launch new technologies. It isn't a platform for future products for developing markets.

That would be quite different at a Hyundai or at today's GM. Hyundai started out with a very small market presence, both quantitatively and prestige-wise and in the size of its cars. The Sonata received a lot of attention, details well done including NHV, but I've not driven one for a couple years so don't know the new model. GM needs to reconquer the sedan market. I've driven both the Malibu and the Impala -- the latter so quiet that I had to double-check that I'd turned on the engine, and with a "clean" interior. I was impressed.

Then there's the Camry – I drove a new one with a few thousands miles on it. It was noisy, wind noise in particular. Then there was an occasional vibration from somewhere in the instrument panel, a matter of both design and (poor) build quality. Next was the instrument panel itself. I counted 12 active functions in the speedometer area, a cacophony of visual information (the mixed metaphor seems appropriate). Speed. Tachometer. Miles per gallon performance. Engine temperature. Odometer. On and on. Other than the speedometer, you really had to take your eyes off the road to decipher these functions – and it wasn't clear why a driver of a modern, automatic transmission family sedan would want a tachometer or most of the other functions. Dysfunctions, actually. There was also a large and hard-to-use LCD display -- and the gas mileage information on it didn't match that found next to the speedometer. Furthermore, the hands-free phone function didn't work consistently, particularly dialing out. The developers clearly hadn't done their homework on testing the bluetooth protocols of various phones against their system. Finally, it drove like a modestly responsive boat. That may be what older drivers want – and by older, I mean those pushing age 80. I don't think that's really their target market in theory, and in practice age 70-something drivers wouldn't be particularly receptive to the boatload of gadgets confronting them every time they got in the car.

So, this is congruent with economic theory. A dominant player plays it safe, and puts its resources into growth areas and pet projects of senior management. Over time of course they lose their dominance. But this sort of thing is not easy to turn around, viz. GM's experience. Toyota has a well-entrenched bureaucracy, structured in ways that date back to when they were an exporter of models developed in Toyoda City. On the marketing side in the US there was Toyota, and Southeast Toyota, and Southwest Toyota, rather than a national structure. And they've bought into the upmarket strategy, with profits (and internal kudos) from Lexus and not small cars. That no longer matches their actual market base and production base, and it leaves them ill-suited to tap new markets such as China and India.

I strongly suspect that this is well-known at Toyota itself; after all, there was an internal coup in Toyota that elevated Akio Toyoda earlier than planned under the normal bureaucratic progression, even before the recall scandal. The Camry suggests however that organizational dynamics are deep-seated and have to date resisted change.

Mike Smitka