Thursday, 24 May 2012

Reverse Import Deja Vu?

...a strong yen should boost exports to Japan...
In 1992 I wrote a paper about Japanese car imports, later picked up by the Economist, in Japanese by Toyo Keizai (東洋経済) and by the MIT International Motor Vehicle Program about the growth of Japanese car imports. Ah, but what news was in that? Well, I was writing about "reverse" imports by Japanese of their cars from the US to Japan, alongside the sales of German firms, the only foreign companies to set up proper dealership networks and import processing infrastructure. The recent strength of the yen against the US dollar and particularly against the Euro, made me wonder if we will see a return to that era.
A headline in the May 24th Sankei Shinbun web site thus caught my eye: Mercedes-Benz will sell the "Smart for Two" for ¥1.59 million (US$19,992; €15,950), about a 14% reduction in price. Other forthcoming models of M-B and BMW will likewise carry lower sticker prices or add a lot of options without raising the price. Now the article doesn't make it clear whether the base is appropriate -- it uses year-on-year comparisons, and in general spring 2011 was not a normal time. Still, it cites rises of 37% for M-B and 27% for BMW.
I've only glanced quickly through recent data: given the volatility of the global economy in general, and the post-3/11 economy of Japan in particular, I was expecting to find the data too noisy to interpret. That's not the case.
First, overall imports are at the highest level in the years for which I have (FY1999 to present), even though at 4.0 million cars FY2011 sales are 10% below their mid-2000s level (and 20% below the 5.1 million unit sales peak at the top of Japan's bubble in 1990).
Second, while the German firms are doing OK, both BMW and Mercedes are down from 2007 and the onset of the global recession; only VW and Audi show signs of a sustained increase. What really is driving the increase is Nissan, which now accounts for about 17% of imports or 50,000 units. This is surely consequent to their moving the production of certain vehicles (such as the March) entirely out of Japan.
Still, total imports of 295,000 units remain rather short of the 393,000 level of 1996. While the Japanese media may be full of hand-wringing about the impact of the yen, the evidence so far is modest, when looked at through the lens of vehicle imports. Realistically, it's probably too soon to tell; vehicle sales strategies are penciled in a couple years in advance. We aren't seeing "reverse imports" of Japanese-brand cars from the US -- yet. So from that perspective we're also not back in 1996, when 85,000 Toyotas and Hondas went westward across the Pacific. But it is worth watching.
Source: 「159万円のベンツ 円高追い風、価格抑え輸入車加速」 which freely translated says "Fanned on by the strong yen, a Benz at ¥1.59 million will accelerate imports." From sankei.jp.msn.com of 25 May 2012.
...Mike Smitka...

Monday, 16 April 2012

Who Would BUY a Chevy Volt?

Who In Their Right Mind Would BUY a Chevy VOLT?
After all, it’s $40K – think about what else one can buy for $40K! There are very nice Lexus, Benz, Infiniti, BMW, and Cadillac models in that price range. AND even with a government subsidy it doesn't stand on its own at $40K. Even if gas hits $5, it doesn't work. Plus who knows what it will be worth in 39 months, or 36 or 48 for that matter. If new technology trumps it, it could be next to worthless. Why take the risk just to be known as an "early adopter?" That's why Bob Lutz, the Father of the VOLT, told us at a fleet conference a while back, "It won't SELL. That's why we're leasing them for $350/month for 39 months."
Lutz says, "We gotta start somewhere if we EVER plan on achieving economies of scale." In true Lutz fashion he compared the VOLT to hunting ducks. "If you shoot at the duck, you will miss it every time. One has to "lead" the duck to hit it. We need to lead the market to have a chance to hit it. If we wait too long, the train has left the station and we are standing on the platform saying, "What happened?"
"Lead, follow, or get out of the way, said Lee Iaccoca. Lutz concurs.
Toyota lost money on every PRIUS beginning in 1996, and did for quite a while. That vehicle is thought to be profitable these days, although they are typically "tight lipped "on such matters. Toyota is now bringing a plug in hybrid to market. (The VOLT was the world’s first plug in hybrid.) Toyota has lots of experience and satisfied hybrid customers now, along with economies of scale.
In the meantime, the VOLT has attracted detractors. The Right Wing in the person of Rush Limbaugh has embraced the VOLT as a car they can hang around the President's neck, despite the fact it had been in development long before he was elected. Actually, Lutz IS the actual "Father of the VOLT." For Lutz to get after the Right Wing takes some doing -- see his Forbe article.
The barrage of untruths continue. A friend from told me that it would take 3 weeks to drive across the country in a VOLT with all the stops to recharge. He said heard it on Right Wing talk radio. In fact, the electric range on VOLT is about 45 miles before the internal combustion engine takes over to propel one across the country as with a normal car. It IS true that the internal combustion engine recharges the batteries which drives the electric motors rather than being actually connected to the drive train in a conventional manner. But to the driver, the difference is not noticeable except the engine doesn’t change RPM based on throttle position.
Others claim they catch fire in a collision. The VOLTs that caught fire had been crash tested and stored improperly for weeks before they caught fire. A vehicle with a regular lead acid battery stands the same risk if stored improperly. As with normal vehicles, the battery should have been removed.
A driver with a less than 30 minute commute to work, and a place to plug in while there, could drive all month without the internal combustion engine using any fuel at all. Figuring 50 miles per day plus other driving, one saves two tanks of fuel per month or about $120. Subtract that from the $350 lease payment and the VOLT can be easily justified. BUT GM has NOT made that case. Worse yet, sales people in Chevy dealerships haven't either. And coupled with the Right Wing misinformation blitz, GM has shut down production for 5 weeks to balance inventories. In my mind, the story has been that GM has not done the math for consumers in their marketing efforts. The marketing story is "$350 minus $120 equals $230./month. That WORKS!!!!!
[Smitka: But obviously consumers don't do the math -- ditto with the Prius, as there's no strong case for buying it on the basis of fuel savings, which is why no other hybrid, including those made by Toyota, sell well. In other words, people buy a Prius to make a statement – hence you don't find "base" models on the lot, the main reason Toyota may make money on the vehicle, despite the cost of installing two powertrains plus a battery pack. GM needs to borrow a bit of that marketing. At the moment, of course, so does Toyota....]
David Ruggles, April 17, 2012

Tuesday, 13 March 2012

Lights Turned Off at Bright Automotive

...new technology can't target the mass market...
The long-run goal for electric vehicles is the mass market. The expense of new technology means that is not the place to start. Instead, there are two alternatives. One is to target the high end of the luxury segment; that is Tesla's strategy. It's not clear, however, that that market is sufficiently large for two firms to survive, and the second – Fisker – is late to market. Others, such as Aptera, wanted to turn out a (very) small vehicle and charge a (super) premium price for it. The vehicle itself would certainly have attracted attention. But the very rich insist on luxury as part of the package, and a tiny car can't deliver that.
The other option is to target a market that is particularly sensitive to fuel efficiency: commercial fleets. That was the strategy of Bright Automotive. Vehicles for (say) UPS in an urban area are on the road all day, with fuel a significant operating cost. But they're not on the road at night, and they may not travel long distances, only long hours. The space and weight of batteries is less of a constraint; there's no chicken-and-egg issue of whether there are enough recharging stations, because they are only needed at the corporate garage. And it's possible to create a value proposition, that the gains in efficiency will offset the higher up-front capital costs. Car purchasers aren't particularly good at that sort of calculation, focusing on "first cost" (purchase price) and not life-of-vehicle costs.
Bright in fact was able to attract purchase commitments from customers on the basis of actual vehicle cost and performance specs. What they needed was capital, in order to fund the nitty-gritty up-front costs of engineering and testing / regulatory approval, and to provide operating capital to let them produce vehicles – they would have to pay workers and capital equipment suppliers and (depending on their bargaining skills) suppliers of parts and components before they were able to deliver their first vehicle and build their revenue stream. And unlike the "supercar" entrants they were looking at production at a relatively high volume; they couldn't accomplish that on a shoe-string, taking the money from the first vehicle they shipped to pay for the parts for the second one. In other words, they intended to be a viable, volume operation, in it to earn a tidy profit on an ongoing basis. But to be a real company in the auto industry takes a lot of resources.
Reuben Munger, the founder, is a W&L econ grad, but that alone isn't enough to impress me, except that he was an exceptionally good student. Reuben is also a former investment banker, and had "skin in the game." Another notch in his favor. We were able to bring him to campus; he met with some of us faculty privately, and gave presentations to our students. What he said made sense, and I'm a hard sell, as I've sat through a lot of presentations of the business case for innovations in the automotive sector.
From the beginning those involved with Bright understood the venture to be risky. However, they were able to raise initial capital for the R&D part of the venture – including from General Motors – because there would be money available for working capital from the Department of Energy loan program.
Unfortunately, that loan program seems to have unofficially closed its doors. The undercurrent in media reports is that it is a victim of the election campaign, where the loans are being tarred by the failure of Solyndra. (See stories in the Washington Post and in Automotive News.) I also wonder if those involved at the Department of Energy were fixated on passenger vehicles; unless you know something of the industry, selling trucks to Snap-On doesn't sound sexy or central to US energy policy.
I've encountered that mindset, even among people with some real grounding in the auto industry, who ought to know better. But then I've benefited from serving as a judge for the Automotive News PACE supplier innovation competition [link], where I've heard the business case for innovations with target markets across the industry, from machine tool and test equipment suppliers, to suppliers of (not-so-generic) materials, to suppliers of components specific to the long-haul "semi" market, to suppliers to the aftermarket (replacement parts), and suppliers to dealers, as well as the "traditional" Tier I suppliers of parts that go into high-volume passenger cars.
One of the hurdles for a firm to win a PACE award is that they show a credible customer has purchased their innovation and has it in use, on the road. And often one customer isn't enough. So when I learned that a number of hard-nosed customers had signed up (I know a bit about one of them, Snap-On), well, I thought Bright should be a slam-dunk. Too bad, because the US needs firms like Bright.
Mike Smitka, Prof of Economics
Washington and Lee University