The Industry in the face of the Euro's (partial) demise

...Eurxit and beyond...

The Euro as currently configured is not sustainable, from both an economic and from a political perspective. Spain cannot possibly deflate its way back to balance, and 20% overall unemployment and 50% youth unemployment is not politically tolerable. The only way out – forcing German banks to write off their Spanish debt now, matched by stimulus sufficient to turn Germany into a net importer – is not on the policy horizon, though in due course German banks will in fact have to write down debt.

If Spain falls, so will other parts of the Euro zone. Greece of course, and Portugal, and Ireland but not Italy? – I'm not euro-centric and don't know enough to create my own list. I assume France, Spain, Benelux, Austria and Finland will remain. To highlight issues, however, it is sufficient to focus on Spain.

The Euro exit process – I've seen the term "Grexit" used for the likely initial case – is not clear-cut. I would hope that central bankers and pan-European financial institutions are (quietly) working on possible scenarios. If so, in our leak-prone world, they really have been quiet. At the moment, a sensible assumption might be a three years of chaos in those exiting, since there seems to be no planning to support a quick and clean break (cf. the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis). In the interim, those remaining on the Euro would face a corresponding period of deep recession. Then would come two years of recovery that would leave economies below peak, followed by an era of more gradual reconstruction. The total: five lean years, less than what drove Israel to Egypt, but potentially just as devastating to the European heartland.

Not all auto firms are equal. For several – Fiat, Peugeot and Renault – Europe dominates their operations. So far VW appears exceptional, because its German sales base has escaped the current crisis and it is larger outside Europe. Then there are BMW and Mercedes, in the upper segment of the market, about which I know little, and so will hazard no guesses.

Other firms have a footprint in Europe, but are not dominated by what happens there: Fordwerke and Opel are but one part of the global operations of Ford and GM. Europe is peripheral for Toyota, Nissan, Honda and Hyundai. Their parent companies may or may not decide to tough things out – GM will have the hardest time –but unlike Euro-centric firms they have the option of exiting. That would matter if both Ford and Opel/GM leave the market, but otherwise would not remove enough capacity to change the equation.

Then there are automotive suppliers, the larger of which have substantial bases in the Americas and Asia, but still have their core in the Euro zone. My sense from visiting suppliers on a regular basis is that they've done a good job of geographic rebalance, to the benefit of firms headquartered in Europe and the detriment of those headquartered in the US. Asian suppliers are on average relatively weaker in Europe, and so will be less affected. Catastrophic failure of any of the large European suppliers would be catastrophic to the industry, the equivalent of Lehman Brothers in the financial world. Renault would (quietly) cheer the failure of PSA or Opel. All would lose in a meltdown of the supplier base.

Shifting gears from firms to geography, Eurxit (pardon the neologism) would bring a large devaluation to Spain. That is most obvious relative to the Euro; imports from Germany and France [Grance? Framany? – the new Europe will need new jargon] would be much more expensive. However, I would also expect the (new) peso to depreciate relative to currencies in peripheral Europe, since Hungary, the UK, Russia and Turkey already reflect a more sustainable level relative to the Euro.

If it could avoid collapse during the transition, Seat as a local firm (albeit also a VW subsidiary) would benefit from a large shift in relative prices that would improve its strategic position. It could become a true value brand in Europe, with increased exports and (due to the higher cost of imports) would have a near-unassailable position in its home market. Seat might still be Skoda's poorer brother, but its place in the VW family would be more secure. Now the labor cost component of local [Spanish] assembly is modest, and many parts and components are imported, muting the initial benefit. Over the space of a few years, however, local content would rise and with it the peso component of the cost base.

In contrast, firms remaining in the Euro cost base would see their export markets shrink, and the burden of the zone's excess capacity is already heavy. Who has deep pockets? VW, yes, but (potentially) Ford, Opel, Toyota, Nissan, Honda and Hyundai. Chrysler isn't big enough to fully balance Fiat, nor Nissan to balance Renault. Absent government intervention, it is hard to imagine all of these small firms surviving five lean years. In addition, GM's pockets aren't deep; Ford is still rebuilding its balance sheet. Eurxit won't help the US economy and it won't help China, so won't help either firm. So it is conceivable that one of them would exit. It is almost inevitable that the European market would witness multiple bailouts, given a greater political sensitivity to unemployment than in the US. This would be to the detriment of VW, and to any of the branch operations of US and Asian-based firms that remain.

This is my first pass at the implications of Eurxit. Additional differentiation would come from breaking down market shares of individual firms between Eurxit and Euro countries; who is strong in the Mediterranean periphery, and hence more vulnerable? Who has the weakest balance sheet among OEMs and among suppliers? On which side of the divide will Italy lie? Who has a stronger base in the non-euro periphery (Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Russia) and so may be better positioned to pick up pieces of the market via exports?

We can always hope for a miracle European unity, that France and Germany can act as one. So far the fear factor is failing to force fraternity. The initial Eurxit – Grexit? – may change that, but my hunch is that by the time it will be too late.

Finally, this places a fundamental strategic choice in front of firms not irrevocably committed to Europe: do you marshal resources for a long and expensive slog there, or do you prepare to retreat and instead concentrate on the Western Hemisphere and Asia? Even with a reconfigured "euro" divide Europe will remain on average prosperous, and with a population larger than the US will remain potentially profitable. But is every current participant willing to wait until 2018 to realize that potential?

...Mike Smitka...

The REAL Reason Recovery is Slow

...from Auto Finance News...

2012 June 2012 was a huge news month. The 2012 Presidential campaign is always good for news, the Miami Heat won the NBA Championship, we had fires and storms, and the Supreme Court issued to important rulings on the Arizona illegal immigration legislation and the Federal health care reform bill commonly known as ObamaCare. Lost in all of this was a report released by the Federal Reserve Bank which dealt with the issue I believe is the real reason for the slow recovery. It’s not taxes. It’s not regulation.

The Federal Reserve report that shows a decline of almost 40% in household net worth from 2007 to 2010. In that time span American’s household wealth dropped to a level not seen since 1992, mostly driven by the precipitous drop in home values due to the bursting of the housing bubble. Eighteen years of gains were wiped out.

The new data comes from the Fed’s Survey of Consumer Finances, a report issued every three years that is one of the broadest and deepest sources of information about the financial health of American families. Families with incomes in the middle 60 percent of the population lost a larger share of their wealth over the three-year period than the wealthiest and poorest families. This is typically the group that drives consumption in our economy. Given the scale of this loss of household net worth and in the face of other headwinds like the European debt crisis, it is a wonder we have had the recovery we have had.

Unless one belongs to what some call the “Field of Dreams School of Economics”, (If you build it they will come), one probably believes that the country’s recovery is stymied by weak demand. This Federal Reserve report quantifies the reason for that weak demand.

In the midst of the current Presidential election we haven’t heard much from either candidate on the subject. Mitt Romney seems to want to hasten the foreclosures and subsequent sales to get deficiencies established so the “bottom” can be reached. I’m not sure that carries favorable political resonance but he said as much during a recent interview. Romney regularly states he thinks that it is taxes, threat of taxes, and regulation holding the economy back, not the evaporation of household wealth. But he can gravitate from being a “supply sider” to a “demand sider” in the blink of an eye.

President Obama has offered up some measures to help keep people in their homes, like the Home Affordable Refinancing Plan (HARP). While HARP and other programs carry positive humanitarian considerations, they might be helping to extend the problem. Unfortunately, it won’t be good for the country if we use the high point of the bubble, 2004 – 2007 as our economic benchmark. The consumption of that era was based on many Americans using their home equity as an ATM machine. A return to those days would mean we would be on the edge of another disaster.

Until consumers feel confident and “wealthy” enough to begin robust consumption, recovery will continue to inch along despite immense pent up demand. Real recovery depends on home values.

The complete report can be found at the link: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf

PS: For more on the impact of this sort of decline in wealth, readers might look at the following post on a survey of "balance sheet recessions." As far as I know -- I happened to be at an early presentation of his in Tokyo in 1992 -- the term was coined by Richard Koo. The blog entry which provides a non-technical overview of this survey is HERE.

Mike Smitka

...see the companion blog usandeconomics.blogspot.com on RomneyCare...

Bad News for Toyota? – the Detroit 3 are Back

...the Detroit 3 are returning to the midsized-car segment...

I'm tossing out back issues of Automotive News to try to fit into a corner office with more windows but less shelf space. I know, crocodile tears for this academic with his shelf-filling collection of books and journals. Anway, one headline caught my eye: "What can save the Detroit 3? Cars!" [a John K. Teahen, Jr. editorial from Sept 18, 2006, p 16].

The context was the near-exit of GM, Ford and Chrysler from the car market, which decreased monotonically from 89% of their sales in 1965 to 35% in 2005, while (correspondingly) trucks went from 11% to 65%. Now admittedly trucks were incredibly profitable on a unit basis, while small cars were a necessary evil, intrinsically unprofitable but needed for CAFE (the Corporate Average Fuel Economy mandate). But the decline at the Detroit 3 was disproportionate to the shift towards light trucks in the over US market.

One point is that ambitious designers, engineers, and senior managers all want to be associated with halo the ka-chenk of good bottom-line vehicles. Teahen argued that the Chevy Impala remained a potential money-earner, with hoped-for sales a bit above the 296,000 of 2006. In fact, on a platform basis, output was higher – 500K – reflecting the multiplication of nameplates that were in fact the same basic car, but the implication of the editorial was that it wasn't making much money. And even with the shift of the overall vehicle market towards light trucks, such sales pale besides the 1-plus-million mark hit of 1965. GM wasn't putting its heavy hitters on car projects.

I've argued before on this blog that Toyota lavishes undue attention on the Prius and on the Lexus marque, again reflecting the status of these projects within the company as a whole. Reputedly Toyota's working to correct that bias, devoting more effort to the 2012 version launched in December 2011. Time will tell if it is better executed and better selling.

Today, however, the Detroit 3 are a factor. They have very different cost structures, with the removal of the millstone of legacy costs from around their neck, a function of the aging of workers "retired" under pre-2007 restructurings, the impact of the VEBA and (for GM and Chrysler) additional costs shed under bankruptcy. Labor is no longer a fixed cost. They thus no longer need to maximize revenue [which for you economics junkies is also implied by the low marginal price of labor]. Instead they can aim to make money from cars. We see that in reduced incentives, reduced fleet sales -- that is, higher prices -- and a normalization of residuals. (I can't speak of leases -- I lack knowledge and suspect that option continues to suffer from the aftershocks of the financial upheaval of 2008-9.)

What does that imply for those who remain focused on cars, particularly Toyota, Honda, and Nissan? On the one hand, they ought to benefit from less discounting. On the other hand, they are hurt by reinvigorated Detroit 3 products. The latter, I believe, dominates: from Toyota's perspective, they have two new, heavy-weight competitors in GM and Ford (and in some product categories, a 3rd in Chrysler), and while Hyundai has been around for a while, sales of the Sonata are only now such as to represent a major slice of the mid-size segment of the Camry and the Accord. If you've become a bit sloppy dare I say arrogant? the sudden appearance of new competitors can be very painful.

My prediction thus is that Toyota (and Honda) will resort to greater discounts and higher fleet sales. That should be good news for new car buyers. (Car renters will have greater choice, but price may not budge much, better residuals will work against higher initial acquisition costs for Enterprise and their rivals.) But since Toyota relies on exports from high-yen Japan for Lexus and (to a lesser extent) the Prius, they've taken a major hit to profits on that front. I'll leave it to financial analysts to pour over segment results of the major players, particularly Toyota, to see if the new competition means their US profits take a hit as well.

Mike Smitka

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