Showing posts with label Chapter 9. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chapter 9. Show all posts

Wednesday, 24 July 2013

Mack Stamping, or a Tale of Detroit's Decline

...[Mack] was a six-story structure [from] 1916...

Detroit is in bankruptcy for three reasons. One is that a city is a fixed cost enterprise, and so adjusting to a sharp drop in revenue is hard to impossible. The second is that Detroit really was the Motor City, but by the 1950s was suffering from the common fate of manufacturing, where as a general rule productivity increases outstrip the growth of demand. The third is that Detroit suffered from the disadvantage of being a first mover: the layout and location of factories reflected the environment of the 1910s and 1920s. Ford Motor Company literally outgrew Detroit, as it moved first from the Piquette Plant to Highland Park in 1910. It began work on its Dearborn Rouge complex in 1917. By the late 1920s it no longer operated inside the city [though in fact Highland Park was itself a separate city, albeit entirely contained within the boundaries of Detroit].

Chrysler's Mack Avenue stamping plant, where I worked during the summers of 1972 and 1973, is a good example of this process. The plant itself was a six-story structure that began as the Michigan Stamping in 1916, making metal and welded assemblies for multiple customers. The facility was bought by Briggs Manufacturing in 1920, in time to catch the rise of enclosed steel bodies. It became a major supplier to Chrysler, which didn't make its first car until 1925. Eventually – in 1953 – Chrysler purchased the facility. (In this Chrysler was fairly late to the game, as GM first purchased a stake in Fisher Body in 1916, and became a full-fledged internal division in 1926.) In other words, by the time I worked there, the plant was already 50+ years old. In my recollection, production only took place on the bottom two floors, while the top two floors couldn't be used; the floors in between were used to store inventory. Production required hauling material up and down freight elevators. Meanwhile, the plant was surrounded by residences and other factories; there was no open land.

http://www.allpar.com/corporate/factories/mack-avenue-engine.html
http://www.allpar.com/corporate/factories/briggs.html
 

Productivity was low not because of unions (though jurisdictional fights were a pain, foreman weren't supposed to turn on and off machines, that was reserved for millwrights). It was simply ancient technology in an ancient building. Presses for large pieces required four men; two would manhandle sheet metal into the die and get it seated properly, two more would pry it loose and put it on a table or conveyor for the next press. For a piece with a lot of curves such as a station wagon roof, my recollection is that there could be as many as 7 presses. Only in 1974 did the company begin trying to use mechanical handlers, suction cups on arms that would slide in, grab a part, and pull it out; by the end of the summer and my return to school, none of them worked reliably. In contrast, today such body panels are made in a single automatic transfer press turning out many, many more parts per hour, attended by only one or two people instead of 29 (28 on the presses, plus a foreman). Higher quality sheet metal for stampings, decades of learning how to pick up and move parts without scratching surfaces, and improvements in press design and die design all contributed. To make matters worse, the layout meant the giant machines were in the middle of the plant, whereas the road access – the shipping docks – were at the end, hundreds of feet away. (The middle of the plant had rail access, but while in the 1970s steel still came in by rail, parts were shipped out by truck.)

For more on stamping plants, go HERE thanks to Sam Ronald

Over time the industry shed thousands of jobs – though some were added back as the market grew and as first emissions and safety requirements, and then consumer demand, led to far more complicated vehicles: air conditioning, power windows, catalytic converters, automatic transmissions, airbags and more. However, that didn't benefit Detroit. Already by the 1970s most of the output of Mack Stamping was sent outside the city – the only assembly plant was Jefferson Avenue. But Chrysler's assembly plants themselves were old. When capacity was added in the US and Canada, new plants reflected different design and manufacturing principles. First, plants were on one level – that transition was already underway by the 1920s as machines with individual electric motors displaced belts pulling power off of overhead shafts. With that the efficiency of a multi-story buidling vanished. In addition, new plants had truck access along their length, and ready access to one of the major interstates. Now Mack Stamping's location wasn't bad as it was only a mile from an entrance to I-94. But many other of Detroit's plants reflected not only the location of rail lines but also the old trolley system – and of course therefore lacked parking.

So as the demand for cars expanded following World War II, and as Studebaker, Packard and other firms shut their doors, the Big Three had to add assembly plants. For that however they needed 1,000-acre sites, for one-floor buildings with more elaborate foundations to take heavier machines, and with room for trucks to maneuver along the full length of the plant, a plant made larger with an integrated stamping plant. Existing plants couldn't be torn down, their footprint was too small and they were often locked in urban streets. Vacant land in such quantity simply didn't exist inside the city. Jobs (and the tax base) moved to the suburbs and further afield.

By 1960, the population was already falling. (The graph is from a blog by Thomas Sugrue.) But people didn't leave in a convenient fashion; while some black neighborhoods had been severed to make way for expressways in the 1950s, Detroit remained a city of multiple small communities. The city simply became less dense. That meant that the per person cost of providing schools, police and fire protection rose rather than fell, because nighborhood schools, fire stations and police precincts couldn't be closed. Fewer jobs meant lower revenue per person. And neither the state nor the Federal government were willing to provide subsidies from stopping the scissors from eventually cutting the city's jugular.

Yes, there was corruption. Is there a big city for which that was not the case? Yes, politicians were short-sighted. No surprise there, either. Yes, the Big Three were poorly managed, and stuck in a strategic position thanks to the direct and indirect subsidies to energy that meant these companies had no small cars when the first and second oil crises hit. Yes, quality was abyssmal (though in the midwest Japanese cars rusted out instantly, one reason market share in the region remained low). That however was an issue of management – at Mack Stamping I was required to hit volume targets, even if every single part was scrap because of flaws in design and machine maintenance. That wasn't the UAW's fault, and until the 1970s the premium over other areas of manufacturing was minimal. Nor was it their fault that they didn't die according to the 1950s pension schedule, but the Detroit Three funded pensions as though they would. Then there's healthcare, and while their benefits were gold-plated, the cost was driven by defects in the US healthcare system, not union contracts.

New entry – first Japanese firms, and subsequently German and Korean – accentuated the pace of exit from Detroit. That wasn't the union's fault, though politicians – in this case Ronald Reagan with his Voluntary Export Restraint – did encourage the Japanese to set up shop here, and adhered to a strong dollar policy that made imports attractive. Race was a contributing factor, as Thomas Sugrue argues – see this interview in Historically Speaking drawn from his fine book, The Origins of the Urban Crisis. But these were not what led to Detroit's downfall, nor was it anything recent – not post-1990, much less post-2007. Instead it was the scissor of fixed costs and falling revenue due to long-run industrial change.

Mike Smitka

A tongue-in-cheek blog post on air conditioning as history's most important invention did suggest one more factor: in the early 20th century living in the South was most unpleasant for many months of the year. (The Alleghanies are sprinkled with ghost towns that functioned as resorts well into the 20th century. A few, such as the Greenbrier, survived the transition.) Improved transportation made possible "snowbirds," and air conditioning made it possible for northerners to conceive of living in the South year-round. Surely without air conditioning BMW would not have located in South Carolina or Mercedes in Alabama, while many more Detroiters would have retired in situ. Ironically, the first use of air conditioning outside of industry was at the Hudson Department Store in downtown Detroit in 1924.

Monday, 8 July 2013

Detroit and New Orleans

Detroit’s Recovery

Edited from a May 14th, 2013 post by Marybeth Benjamin on the Econ 244 web site

The eye opening drive through the city of Detroit during our weeklong trip perfectly showcased the devastation and the challenges that the city faces. The trip was particularly poignant for me because of the striking similarities between my city, New Orleans, and Detroit.

I saw the beautiful neighborhood of Indian Village, well-maintained mansion after mansion, bordered by crumbling buildings and abandoned homes. Everywhere I looked outside of such intact neighborhoods I saw abandoned street blocks, some with only one house in livable condition. It reminded me of the moment I returned home to New Orleans a few months after Hurricane Katrina. It devastated the city, but disproportionately affected some of the poorer areas.

The similarities did not stop there: During the last decade following hurricane Katrina, the population in New Orleans decreased by almost 30%, which parallels Detroit’s 25% population decline in the past 10 years.

After viewing the city and the extent of the decline, I couldn’t help but wonder if Detroit will ever make a full recovery some day.

Oliver Liu added on May 14, 2013 that Detroit will never return to its heyday. At the Detroit Institute of Arts in the exhibition Motor City Muse: Detroit Photographs, Then and Now there were exercises in rephotography; pictures that showed the city in the mid 20th century bustling and pictures just recently taken of the same places showed just a shadow of past activity. Over time more mechanization will take place in factories and I doubt the population of the city will ever approach peak levels, which is a real problem as the city which can’t pay its debt and has large pension obligations to retired public servants.

"G" Jeong commented on May 14, 2013 that as per class discussions during our time in the city, the decline in Detroit was not sudden. It took a long time for Detroit to become a “devastated” city. Remembering what I saw from DIA, I also agree with Oliver and Professor Smitka that it is not possible for Detroit to recover unless something happens (government involvement?). By recovery, I meant it will be extremely difficult for Detroit to go back to its 1 million population days [much less its peak of nearly 2 million].

the prof wrote on May 15, 2013 that a city has tremendous fixed costs. In addition, the down cycle was not governed by any local planning, so no neighborhood in Detroit is totally gone. As a result, it’s hard to close down police and fire stations, or elementary schools, because they need to be close to where people live.

On top of that Detroit has decades of corrupt government – Louisiana doesn’t exactly have a reputation for clean government, either, but Detroit is exceptional, with the previous mayor and various close associates in prison, or heading that way. Tens if not hundreds of millions were embezzled, and (while not necessarily due to corruption) politicians frittered away lots more on projects that with hindsight proved inappropriate to the city’s needs.

Politically the state of Michigan doesn’t want to help Detroit (and is itself hurting), and the Federal government is nowhere to be seen. A slow disaster does not qualify for FEMA assistance. There’s no money to tear down the odd abandoned house in an otherwise intact neighborhood, and that makes it harder for adjacent houses to avoid blight – they lose their resale value. Teachers can’t be paid, with the connivance of city officials the warehouse that’s supposed to hold books and supplies is empty, and with the collapse of employment families are unstable. Kids suffer, through no fault of their own.

Cruise the city and count the grocery stores. It's not hard – in many neighborhoods there are none. For those interested, read a new book (2013), Detroit: An American Autopsy by Charlie LeDuff. It’s a riveting read, but I didn’t pick it up until long after I ordered books for the term.

Paul kuveke wrote on May 15, 2013 that maybe the city of Detroit should not spend resources trying to lower its fixed costs but rather try to draw people back into the city. Detroit has a horrible reputation throughout the country (on YouTube "we’re not detroit" is a popular phrase: watch this example). While Detroit was a lot better than what I’d heard, it's difficult to counter the perception of those who've never visited. It doesn’t help that for the past few years Detroit has ranked in the top 3 U.S. cities for violent crime.

On May 17, 2013 Tyler Kaelin wrote that he agrees with Paul, Detroit has some wonderful things to offer, but it will never return to its former glory until it can escape its less then attractive past. The auto industry hurt Detroit in more than one way in this regard. People see the Detroit 3 as an extension of Detroit itself. At the congressional meetings when people became angry and frustrated with the Detroit 3, they were becoming angry at Detroit by extension.

Monday, 15 November 2010

The Crisis Yet to Come

The Atlanta Fed's blog from October 27, 2010 has a chilling piece on the source of the downturn in revenue at the state level (and by implication the local level, too). Quite simply, they note and then back with data that (duh! - with hindsight) real estate assessments lag the market. Hence the downturn has to have other sources, specifically declines in individual income tax receipts and sales tax receipts. Real estate tax receipts have actually continued to rise, as higher assessments from the era of peak prices continue to track up.
That's chilling, because it implies that state and local governments will continue to see revenues fall as assessments are updated to track the market down. Now the level of dependence on real estate related revenue varies widely. But on average it suggests that even if incomes begin to recover, government revenues will continue to fall.
Indeed, a recent paper by Cogan and Taylor quantifies the magnitude of the downturn: budget cuts by state and local governments fully offset the much-maligned Obama stimulus package. They had earlier taken a stand on the "multiplier" (the extent to which an expenditure increase or tax cut would stimulate activity). [Look for a discussion of multiplier estimates by Brad de Long.] But when they went to check what ex post performance might show, they found a problem that rendered that discussion moot: ex post, there was no multiplicand to be multiplied. Of course that's not reassuring going forward, because in 2011 there won't be a stimulus package to offset what state and local government are doing. When teachers are fired next summer, and as road maintenance crews are axed and parks closed, there won't be anyone stepping in to hire them or pay for them to be rehired. Now Cogan and Taylor think the multiplier is small; I'm not convinced by their arguments. But small multiplier or large, the job losses will be real.
John F. Cogan and John B. Taylor, "What the Government Purchases Multiplier Actually Multiplied in the 2009 Stimulus Package." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 16505, October 2010. http://www.nber.org/papers/w16505
If we thought banks were too big to fail, what of the government of the 10th largest economy in the world, California? They are starting their 2011 budget cycle with a $25 billion deficit and a long period of underfunding state and local pension funds. I doubt there's enough available for cutting on the expenditure side, and while I've never lived there, my sense is that there is no ability to enhance revenue, given the demonstrated ability of vocal citizens' movements to impede government via referenda. Pundits may be comparing us to Greece to argue that we need to cut the Federal deficit, but they really don't understand the dynamics of bond markets. But they can and should look at California, and ask whether we will feel compelled to bail them out as the EU did with Greece.
Mike Smitka
Addenda
Readers might see a contrarian position at Slate Moneybox, Default Position: Why we needn't worry too much about municipal bankruptcy by Annie Lowry. She argues first that the incentives are strong to avoid bankruptcy, while a crisis increases policy options. Second, though only implicit in her argument, bond holders can be forced to renogotiate without bankruptcy. While she does not mention it, many bonds are very close to private placements, and that facilitates renegotiating debt. (I handled sovereign debt renegotiations during a banking career decades back.) Third, and again less explicit, the biggest obligations are not formal bonds but retirement systems. It may be possible to renege on those -- tell retirees "no more pension." That may not need Chapter 9. In sum, all of those lessen the role of formal bankruptcy.
Elsewhere I calculated the numbers for California. Their accounting is arcane, but at the state level the budget is around $100 billion with a projected $25 billion deficit. That means tax receipts of $75 billion, so that closing the gap via revenue enhancement would in the extreme require a 33% increase in taxes (and more in tax rates, given exemptions). But in the background California's GDP is approximately $1 trillion, so the gap is on the order of 2.5% of personal and corporate incomes. Of course the state has perhaps $500 billion in unfunded pension obligations. Now in most places where I've lived government salaries are below market so these pensions are in effect part of the total package. I don't believe it ethical to adjust those retroactively. But in any case the magnitude of the problem is well within the taxing ability of the state, without leading to exorbitant rates. The problem is one of politics, not economics.