Showing posts with label debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label debt. Show all posts

Monday, 15 November 2010

The Crisis Yet to Come

The Atlanta Fed's blog from October 27, 2010 has a chilling piece on the source of the downturn in revenue at the state level (and by implication the local level, too). Quite simply, they note and then back with data that (duh! - with hindsight) real estate assessments lag the market. Hence the downturn has to have other sources, specifically declines in individual income tax receipts and sales tax receipts. Real estate tax receipts have actually continued to rise, as higher assessments from the era of peak prices continue to track up.
That's chilling, because it implies that state and local governments will continue to see revenues fall as assessments are updated to track the market down. Now the level of dependence on real estate related revenue varies widely. But on average it suggests that even if incomes begin to recover, government revenues will continue to fall.
Indeed, a recent paper by Cogan and Taylor quantifies the magnitude of the downturn: budget cuts by state and local governments fully offset the much-maligned Obama stimulus package. They had earlier taken a stand on the "multiplier" (the extent to which an expenditure increase or tax cut would stimulate activity). [Look for a discussion of multiplier estimates by Brad de Long.] But when they went to check what ex post performance might show, they found a problem that rendered that discussion moot: ex post, there was no multiplicand to be multiplied. Of course that's not reassuring going forward, because in 2011 there won't be a stimulus package to offset what state and local government are doing. When teachers are fired next summer, and as road maintenance crews are axed and parks closed, there won't be anyone stepping in to hire them or pay for them to be rehired. Now Cogan and Taylor think the multiplier is small; I'm not convinced by their arguments. But small multiplier or large, the job losses will be real.
John F. Cogan and John B. Taylor, "What the Government Purchases Multiplier Actually Multiplied in the 2009 Stimulus Package." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 16505, October 2010. http://www.nber.org/papers/w16505
If we thought banks were too big to fail, what of the government of the 10th largest economy in the world, California? They are starting their 2011 budget cycle with a $25 billion deficit and a long period of underfunding state and local pension funds. I doubt there's enough available for cutting on the expenditure side, and while I've never lived there, my sense is that there is no ability to enhance revenue, given the demonstrated ability of vocal citizens' movements to impede government via referenda. Pundits may be comparing us to Greece to argue that we need to cut the Federal deficit, but they really don't understand the dynamics of bond markets. But they can and should look at California, and ask whether we will feel compelled to bail them out as the EU did with Greece.
Mike Smitka
Addenda
Readers might see a contrarian position at Slate Moneybox, Default Position: Why we needn't worry too much about municipal bankruptcy by Annie Lowry. She argues first that the incentives are strong to avoid bankruptcy, while a crisis increases policy options. Second, though only implicit in her argument, bond holders can be forced to renogotiate without bankruptcy. While she does not mention it, many bonds are very close to private placements, and that facilitates renegotiating debt. (I handled sovereign debt renegotiations during a banking career decades back.) Third, and again less explicit, the biggest obligations are not formal bonds but retirement systems. It may be possible to renege on those -- tell retirees "no more pension." That may not need Chapter 9. In sum, all of those lessen the role of formal bankruptcy.
Elsewhere I calculated the numbers for California. Their accounting is arcane, but at the state level the budget is around $100 billion with a projected $25 billion deficit. That means tax receipts of $75 billion, so that closing the gap via revenue enhancement would in the extreme require a 33% increase in taxes (and more in tax rates, given exemptions). But in the background California's GDP is approximately $1 trillion, so the gap is on the order of 2.5% of personal and corporate incomes. Of course the state has perhaps $500 billion in unfunded pension obligations. Now in most places where I've lived government salaries are below market so these pensions are in effect part of the total package. I don't believe it ethical to adjust those retroactively. But in any case the magnitude of the problem is well within the taxing ability of the state, without leading to exorbitant rates. The problem is one of politics, not economics.

Tuesday, 25 August 2009

No More Clanging Clunkers, No More Sales

Mike Smitka

What, now that the clunkers program has clanged to a close? In a couple days we'll see what total August sales were like – I'm risking bytes of criticism writing now – but I'm afraid it will be back to business as normal. Afraid, because normal this year has been an SAAR of 10 million or less. The level of enthusiasm makes it clear that sales have been pulled forward; it'll be payback time. The problems run deeper: cars were affected by the bubble, and not just housing.
A recent NBER working paper by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi of the University of Chicago bolsters the argument that I've made in earliers notes. My analysis was based solely on an analysis of sales and scrappage data relative to the vehicle stock; they started out with data on 266,000 individuals in the Equifax credit rating database. (Don't worry – they couldn't actually look at individual records, but instead had to extract information from data that Equifax had already sanitized and then mildly aggregated.) But combined with data on geography and housing prices and demographics, they could paint a picture of where prices had gone up, areas where housing supply was "inelastic" so that shifts in demand showed up as higher prices rather than more construction. They could then look at who borrowed: not those with in places where prices moved little, but those who were in "hot" markets, and who started out with lower incomes and/or lower credit scores. And did they ever tap the equity; credit records made it clear that these people were also buying a lot of vehicles, vehicles they earlier had not been able to afford. But those same locations are ones where mortgage holders are now under water (see Federal Reserve data on credit conditions, illustrated by maps color-coded at the county level). They're losing their houses and their cars, not buying new ones. In other words, there was a bubble in the auto market as well, people buying on credit backed by unrealized capital gains.
That really is not news, though it makes for sobering and poignant stories (see the New York Times series on the Beth Court neighborhood in Moreno Valley, outside LA). But what Mian and Sufi show is that behavior didn't change much in the many urban areas where there was no run-up in housing prices (I'll append a graph I created from the Case Schiller real estate index that illustrates the contrast). In other words, the big boom in car sales came from the same people who were splurging on home renovations and vacations by pulling equity out of their houses. Well, that equity isn't there to the tune $1 trillion in California alone (data from an August 13th study by First American CoreLogic). In Nevada 45% of homeowners have negative equity of 25% or more of their mortgages; in California, 25%. These people aren't buying cars anytime soon. So while house prices may have bottomed out – and the recession ended – that doesn't mean the good times will roll again.
That's not only because of all the people who lost everything (or soon will, given that 5% of the labor force has now been unemployed for over 27 weeks, and another 2% for 15-26 weeks). On average the rest of us are worried. State and local governments are only now cutting their budgets; commercial real estate hasn't hit bottom yet. There are a lot of pink slips yet to be distributed. So there's no reason to think those of us who were more conservative in our habits are suddenly going to loosen pursestrings that long have been tight. Let's be honest with ourselves; if we're thrifty, it's by necessity: home equity is what we have from paying down the mortgage, not because the spot of mother earth we occupy was suddenly worth megabucks

The graphs below look at housing prices relative to the CPI index, real GDP and nominal GDP. One focuses on four of the metropolitan areas with the greatest run-up in prices, a couple of which have come back to earth, and then some. The other highlights cities where there was comparatively little change. I left the scale the same on both, which results in a lot of blank space on the second one, plus it's hard to read because the graphs lie more or less on top of each other. Which is the point it is meant to illustrate.

Here's a link to a powerpoint from a talk I gave yesterday (Aug 25, 2009) that includes additional material.


Click to enlarge!

Click to enlarge!