Showing posts with label tesla. Show all posts
Showing posts with label tesla. Show all posts

Thursday, 19 December 2013

The Best Car Ever

Guest post by Blake Grady, edited by the prof with comments from Econ 244 participants. Original was from May 17, 2013.
This is one I had in draft form but apparently forgot to publish last spring – my apologies to Blake and commenters

Tesla Model S

Consumer Reports recently gave the Tesla Model S a score of 99 out of 100, and other media outlets immediately began proclaiming that the car could be the best vehicle ever made. A small number of journalists responded by arguing that the entire idea of a "best car" simply doesn't make any sense.

...the entire [ratings] concept ... makes no sense

Does this vehicle look comparable to the Tesla Model S?

I agree with them, but I drew an even more extreme conclusion from reading about the car and the consumer reports rating system: the entire concept doesn't make any sense. People buy cars for remarkably different reasons: perhaps a Range Rover to drive around Manhattan in isolated comfort, or the same Range Rover to tow horses to a show. In this case, even with the same vehicle, it would receive two different ratings: one of the New Yorker and one for the horse owner.

This issue becomes worse when trying to compare different vehicles. Comparing an F-350 pickup to a Tesla Model S on the same rating system is almost impossible. The question then becomes why do journalists use this system? My guess is that reviewers have found that people find the ratings systems more interesting when they can compare all of the models together, even if they make less sense that way.

The prof pointed out that such rankings have two audiences. One is the car guys (and gals) who like to argue about features and driveability and styling. Ratings are great to spur discussions over beer (or, perhaps for a Tesla, wine). The other are car purchasers, who are likely to look at sites that compare cars within the same segment. For them, these grand competitions and “best of the best” ranking games are not meaningful, as you point out. However, cars are an aspirational purchase, and “halo” cars and the general image of a brand matter. If nothing else, you want all your cars to have decent to good ratings…

Tyler Kaelin agrees as one of those car guys. Although I read car reviews all the time, my parents (people who have actually bought cars before!) could care less. Their concerns are general reputation in terms of quality and reliability, price, and the test drive. Where does that leave the purpose of these reviews, I begin to wonder? Maybe they are part of that “general reputation.”

Griffin Cook notes that a unified rating system makes sense given a very specific [strong!] requirement: that it is based on the “drivability” of the car and ignores function. In this sense, the slower, less fuel efficient F-350 is a lesser car then the Model S. While a pickup truck is obviously meant to serve a different function, the point of a view of a driver behind the wheel matters. However, Consumer Reports is not that narrowly focused, and their subjective reviews do not provide consistent information for potential buyers who consider their opinion to be authoritative.

Daniel Tomm seconded Blake: the rating system does not make sense if comparing an SUV to a sedan. It would be fine if they had different classes for each type of vehicle (i.e. SUV, light truck, heavy truck, sports car, sedan). Each vehicle serves its purpose — though I do not know what category concept cars such as the ME.WE would fall in. Personal preference makes a difference and like Tyler and the professor said, the car purchaser has the ultimate say. I know when I was first looking at cars, trucks were out of the question because my father thought they were impractical and I would never be lugging around logs or construction equipment. In terms of reviews I never truly looked at “best of the best” but if I saw a car I liked and a friend drove it I would ask their general opinion in order to get real feedback from someone who was not trying to sell me the car.

Wednesday, 23 October 2013

People LOVE Their Car Dealer, But Hate Yours

Steve Finlay - WARDS June 2013

People carry on a love-hate relationship with car dealers.

They typically love their dealer, as evidenced by rating websites where grateful customers say things like:

  • “He cares about his clients and is extremely helpful with any questions or issues.”
  • “I have always been extremely pleased with the service and professionalism.”
  • “It was honestly the BEST customer service I’ve received in my whole life.”

But many consumers dump on dealers in general. Disliking from afar is a human flaw. Disdaining faceless groups is a building block of bias.

So when the National Automobile Dealers Assn. said the traditional franchised-dealer system actually protects consumers, angry Internet users began pounding their keyboards.

“Yes, everyone I know leaves a dealership thinking, gee, that dealership is really interested in protecting me and my interests rather than their own interests,” one sarcastic wag wrote in the reader comment section of an online story mentioning NADA’s claim.

“Very disappointed to see that NADA thinks we’re a bunch of morons who will buy this line,” someone else commented. “I could respect them more if they would just come out and say they were trying to squash a competing business model.”

Another person proclaimed: “The arrogance of trying to tell us they are just watching out for our best interests is stunning.”

All this bluster is tied to electric-vehicle maker Tesla deciding to short-circuit the conventional dealer system by selling its vehicles directly to customers.

Tesla has opened small showrooms here and there where shoppers can check out the single-product Model S, then order one online from the manufacturer.

Some consumers think that’s the way to go. They see dealers as needless middlemen who hike up vehicle prices, even though one could argue prices would rise if dealers weren’t competing against each other, and a customer instead had to buy a particular vehicle from only one source: an auto maker.    

Many foes of the franchise system seem woefully uninformed about how it works. Yet, they praise Tesla founder Elon Musk for trying to “revolutionize” how cars are sold. But auto companies, not dealers, came up with the franchise system.

Auto makers did that because they deemed it better for someone else to sell and service products, especially if that someone covers the facility costs. Accordingly, dealers collectively have invested billions in their stores.

Auto makers realize their core competency is in making vehicles, not selling them. Every now and then, an auto maker will give auto retailing a shot. In the late 1990s, Ford unsuccessfully tried in certain markets, such as Tulsa, OK, and Salt Lake City, UT. It took years for the smoke to clear from that bomb.

A newspaper columnist decries the fact that if you want a Ford, you can’t march down to your local general car store to get one. No, you must buy it from a Ford dealer.

That’s because auto makers want it that way. They don’t want big-box auto stores selling different brands, side by side, under one roof. You’d find plenty of dealers willing to do that, but good luck finding a manufacturer.

Dealer associations and Tesla are battling legally and legislatively over the EV maker’s desire to sell cars directly to consumers. Meanwhile, Tesla stock looks like a bubble ready to burst.

“Elon Musk has done an amazing job of driving up Tesla’s stock price,” Bill Wolters, president of the Texas Automobile Dealers Assn., tells me. “He’s a master of P.R. What puzzles me is that he has never tried the franchise system, yet he insists it won’t work for him.”

Throughout automotive history, start-up companies selling limited-appeal products in unconventional ways have suffered high fatality rates.

I’m not saying the dealership franchise system is perfect or that it will last forever. But I bet it outlives Tesla Motors.

Friday, 27 September 2013

Maryann Keller Speech to the NADA/JD Power Conference, NYC, MArch 2013

For the over four decades I’ve been involved with the auto industry, first as an investment analyst and now as a consultant and director serving on the boards of both automotive companies and auto dealers. Over those four decades, I’ve heard many arguments made against the franchise dealer system…which dealers never fail to disprove time and time again.

One myth promulgated in the 1990s - and now resurfaced by Tesla - is that factory stores save money by reducing distribution expenses wrongly estimated at 30% of total expense. Let’s put aside for the moment that the percentage itself is nonsense, Ford’s ill-fated Auto Collection experiment proved conclusively (as told to me by a former Ford executive last week) that corporate guys are not risk takers and lack the entrepreneurial spirit to manage dealerships. Big corporations control from the top but selling cars requires street smarts and adapting to local market and competition. Ford ended its experiment after a couple of years of market share losses amid mounting evidence that factory stores do not deliver a better customer experience nor reduce costs, in fact they proved to be bad at both. GM, perhaps after watching Ford’s travails, and despite repeating the same nonsense about reduced costs through factory ownership, canceled its plans to buy 10% of its dealers, plus the Saturn stores, and operate them in through what it called GM Retail Holdings. Ford’s failed experiment demonstrated that, franchise laws notwithstanding, dealers are essential partners in the long process of a car’s journey from the factory to a customer’s garage. Franchise laws protect dealers from arbitrary actions by automakers and given the financial commitments they continue to make in response to factory demands in image programs, equipment, training and even vendor selection, the laws are entirely reasonable. Given the intense competition in auto retailing, it’s hard to understand how anyone could suggest that franchise laws hurt consumers.

Franchise dealers’ cumulative investment in land, equipment and facilities easily exceeds $100 billion. Dealers fund 60 days of inventory and another month of inventory in transit that would otherwise fall to the car maker. The inventory buffer allows automakers to adjust future production levels. For a company like Ford US inventory funding equals about $15 billion at any point in time.

Tesla may be the first start up to launch a car and change the retail process as well but it is definitely not the only company that saw dealerships as a costly impediment to customer bliss. A few years ago I was involved with one such company funded by venture capitalists, and led by a non-automotive executive, that invested in a small car promising to build to order sold though mall-based stores. The car never made it to production and the company folded after consuming the investors’ capital. . Despite evidence to the contrary and lacking any real world understanding to the business, a journalist writing on Yahoo Autos last year stated “Instead of building cars and selling them to dealers who hawk them to shoppers, Tesla wants to build only cars to customers orders, eliminating part of the auto industry’s massive overhead costs in inventory. By selling cars directly Tesla’s executives believe they can make their customer happy, and eventually sell more cars for less money.” Well we will see if it is fact is more economical for the factory to pay the rent, salaries, delivery and service or have someone else do it using his or her own capital. And build to order works only as long as there is an order bank…what happens when the orders dry up…do you send the assembly workers home, tell your suppliers to send to stop producing until you call?…..unfortunately auto assembly really doesn’t lend itself to build to order. It is capital and labor intensive even when work is farmed out to suppliers.

Every dealer knows that the vast majority of customers want their car that day not a date convenient to a manufacturer. The dealer has always been the buffer with the automaker facilitating inventory management through various incentives and production adjustments. It is the dealer who finds the market-clearing price for a vehicle even at the sacrifice of his or her profits. Others have tried experiments in selling away from the traditional retail dealer location on the notion that a big box retailer or mall would mitigate advertising expenses by placing cars where the customers are.

Early in the 2000s, Asbury struck a deal with Walmart to sell used cars in the parking lots of Walmart stores. Asbury would take the cars to where the retail customers were at America’s busiest retailer. A few dealers have experimented (as Tesla is now doing) renting inline space in large shopping malls as storefronts to sell cars. So far, the history of non-dealership settings to sell cars – with perhaps the exception of the infrequent offsite tent sale – hasn’t worked. The Asbury/Walmart experiment ended in less than two years when both parties discovered there were too few car buyers among the static population of regular customers who shopped for food and other necessities at their local Walmart each week.

I suspect that once the novelty associated with Tesla wears off, it too will also discover that mall locations aren’t ideal places to market or sell cars. The enclosed shopping mall typically has several large anchor stores – Nordstrom, Macy’s, Neiman Marcus, etc. – and perhaps eighty to one hundred or so “in line” shops like GAP, the Limited, Zale’s, Sunglass Hut, Apple, etc. A large successful mall might have more than a million or more visitors a year – and that’s about 3,000 folks per day. Those big numbers can dazzle but they aren't what they seem. Much of this traffic represents repeat visitors, as it did at Walmart, coming each week or so to see the changing merchandise at her favorite stores – new fashion and seasonal clothing, makeup, shoes or the latest Apple gadget. Everything can be purchased on a credit card. I used the pronoun “her” deliberately because the vast majority of mall stores are dedicated to women and children not the men who would be the targets for an expensive, high tech performance car.

Furthermore, new car models are only really new only every four to six years. The merchandise doesn’t change very often – so on the second or third visit to the mall, the car store looks exactly as it did last month or even the month before. What was fresh once is now stale with the passage of time…so visitors to the mall just skip past that new car display.

What the uninformed forget – or figure out after an attempt or three – is that automotive retailing is very different from traditional retailing. The product car dealers sell is expensive, generally requires financing, and often involves a trade. It often includes helping shoppers match their budget to a car that might not be their first choice but rather one they can afford. The process is slowed by required disclosures and regulations resulting in a pile of documents that have to be signed even for the most straightforward transaction.

A car weighs 4,000 pounds and takes up 50 square feet of space. It can’t be delivered overnight to one’s front door by Fedex. And most folks don’t have a big enough credit limit on their Visa card to pay for it. And what do they do with their trade? Or get it serviced?

While we are talking about myths, how about the still repeated one that people hate dealers so, if given the chance, they will buy a car online. I almost don't know where to start in taking this one apart…..In the early days of the Internet, Silicon Valley funded and lost hundreds of millions, maybe even a billion dollars, on ill-fated ventures that promised to do just that. CarOrder.com, Greenlight.com, and CarsDirect.com (in its original configuration), among others, all promised to avoid the dealership experience. A few actually did that by buying cars from dealers and then reselling them at lower prices to customers until they blew through their capital. Build to Order.com proposed that you would place your order for a fully customized car while lounging in a company-owned showroom entertainment center. Again here the premise was to build these cars using an automaker’s parts and technology but avoiding high labor costs and dealerships and give the customer the exact car they wanted. Build-to-order.com never built anything for anyone. In 1999 and 2000, I ran priceline.com’s experiment with selling cars online, which like most others of the era no longer exists. The essential elements of the priceline model were replicated by TrueCar.com and of course they too ran afoul of franchise laws for the same reasons as priceline. What I learned then – and this is still true today – we could connect buyers with dealers and that the price of a vehicle was the easiest part of a deal. The other elements are harder to control and often the cause of frustration for the customer and the dealer. People don’t like to hear that their trade isn’t worth the value they saw online or that their poor credit doesn’t qualify them for the no down payment, zero percent loan. There are few people who would think about buying a house online from a few photos taken make rooms seem larger than they are or the neighbors Beware of dog sign. Buying a car is comparable to buying a house, why should we think it should be as easy as buying a pair of shoes from Zappos with a return receipt in the box in case they don’t fit.

Although many automotive websites claim to have “sold” millions cars, even today twelve years after priceline decided to concentrate exclusively on travel, automotive websites link a buyer to a dealer who actually sells the car. The Internet has mostly replaced the newspaper as a source of information about cars and dealers but it has not reduced advertising expense per vehicle or made buying a car as easy as buying a book.

Add up all the monthly traffic to all automotive sites, including automakers, dealers and independent sites – and you’d get more than 100 million possibly close to 200 million unique visitors using the web to get information about buying or selling a new or used car. Except there’s one problem if this traffic is somehow suppose to represent potential sales…the total number of new and used cars sold by dealers at retail and excluding fleet each month is only about two million units, and that is probably generous given that not all retail customers go online..some might just release the same brand of the leased car they are returning to the dealer. So the real shoppers – however you want to define that number – are only a small fraction of the total visitors. So just like newspaper, radio, or TV advertising, dealer spend on the internet is likely no better targeted – once again dispelling the notion that the internet would solve the age-old problem of knowing which 50% of a dealer’s advertising works.

And what was once promised as to the beauty of the Internet for used cars…listings of available cars with pictures, even videos, and stated pricing would make it easy for shoppers to find the best car at the best price. But what has happened is that for any given vehicle, within a similar bandwidth of age, mileage, trim, the price range for specific models is usually within a few hundred dollars, not enough to make price the deciding purchase factor. The Internet hasn’t created a pricing advantage for any seller and customers simply have confirmation that similar cars within a market are priced the same. With the exception of hard to find cars, the differentiating factors are having the car the customer wants, proximity of the dealership and the dealer’s reputation in providing a good customer experience.

In summary, technology is a wonderful thing…and dealers have adopted it nearly full tilt. Sophisticated software to manage every aspect of the business is now de riguer…BDC’s to support internet sales…and eDocuments will eventually become the norm. But the point is that the system of franchised dealers – using their own risk capital to fund their businesses and guarantee millions of dollars of inventory, promote their own brand and that of their OEM, provide the expensive tools needed in their service departments, and manage the endless headache of a workforce – will not be superseded by technology or factory owned mall stores. Factories have learned that they cannot do a better job than independent businessmen at the retail level. And new start ups – many of whom will come and go – with new systems of selling and servicing retail automobiles will all reach the same conclusion: the dealer network is the best way. Thank you for listening today.

Tuesday, 20 August 2013

Tesla says Model S crash test score is best NHTSA has ever recorded

by Jonathan Ramsey of AutoBlog

"We found out a couple of weeks ago that the Tesla Model S aced the crash tests administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. What we didn't know until Tesla filled in some of the details is that the Model S scored more than five stars on the way to recording the best result of any car the NHTSA has ever tested. While NHTSA's highest public rating is five stars, the Vehicle Safety Number it gives to manufacturers can go higher, and Tesla says the Model S scored a 5.4. That's a better result than has ever been achieved in NHTSA testing of a passenger car, SUV or minivan.

Tesla's press release says that after its internal tests showed that it would score five stars on government's crash tests, it addressed any other weak points it found on the vehicle to ensure it would get perfect marks "no matter how the test equipment was configured." It was already going to do well in the frontal test, as the lack of an engine allows much more leeway in creating an occupant-saving crumple zone. And the rollover test was aided by the battery pack being located in the floor. The low center of gravity meant that the Model S couldn't be rolled over "via the normal methods and special means were needed to induce the car to roll."

Nested aluminum extrusions along the hatchback's flanks took care of the side pole intrusion test, the Model S not only scoring five stars but, according to Tesla, leaving nearly nine times more "driver residual space" post-impact than the five-star rated Volvo S60. And when the roof of the Model S was tested for crush resistance, the testing machine broke just after it crossed the four-G mark - the Model S, on the other hand, didn't."

Ruggles writes: A neighbor bought one of these. It is flat out beautiful. I have seen them at auto shows and at a Tesla showroom, but this is the first one I've seen on the road. My wife made me go around the block for another look, and she is ambivalent about cars.

I predict the beef over the Tesla company owned showrooms will blow over. Even Elon Musk isn't rich enough to finance a real distribution system, even if he included all of his friends. As long as they are a boutique manufacturer, he'll be just fine with the current setup, as we noted in a May 23rd post on Tesla's Distribution Challenge. The next step, if he gets that far, will require a dealership system. He will be selling off his company owned stores for large multiples. It isn't practical to try to attract investors if they know they would be having to compete against their supplier. Then there are those pesky franchise laws.

Wednesday, 19 June 2013

State Franchise Regulation


This is the fourth carryover from student blogs, with guest blogger Asher Stevens-Lubin. In his defense he wrote this post at the very start of the term, before we'd covered franchising issues (and had David in as a speaker). Both Ruggles and Smitka append comments. Roberts-Lubin's citations are detailed at the bottom.

The cost of the auto distribution system in the United States has been estimated as averaging up to 30 percent of vehicle price, with 15 percent on the end of the manufacturer (in the form of advertising, loans, and rebates) and the other 15 percent solidly on the side of the retailer, or dealer. This 15 percent of the total price of a given vehicle is due to the cost to dealers of financing inventory, paying for insurance, advertising, and paying commissions. [Source: Marti et al.]


Early in the history of the US auto industry, most manufacturers sold their vehicles directly to the consumer. However with the advent of Ford’s assembly line and the mass-production of automobiles, distribution was more efficient through retailers since manufacturers mainly had just one or two factories located near resources like steel mills (making the assessment of demand and provision of customer services easier for retailers).

In these early days, this franchise system was conducted through voluntary contracts between manufacturers and dealers. However since then, virtually every state has codified the automobile franchise system, making it illegal for manufacturers to sell automobiles directly to the consumer; largely because states earn around 20 percent of their sales taxes from automobile retail, but also because car dealerships account for, on average, 7-8 percent of employment. [Source: Lafontaine & Morton]

Ruggles writes: This is the first misnomer. The reason for state franchise law is to protect Dealers from their Suppliers. A Dealer makes a SIGNIFICANT investment to represent an OEM's products. That Dealer is then in in a position of subjugation to that supplier without significant protection other than the traditional franchise agreement. The supplier could over supply or under supply on a whim. The supplier could provide premium stock to a competitor while withholding premium stock from the original Dealer. The supplier could make unreasonable demands on the original Dealer and use the control of inventory supply, compensation for warranty repairs, etc. to coerce Dealer. Without Dealer protection the supplier could open a factory owned store near the franchise Dealer, and under sell that dealer to drive them out of business. This is the primary reason for Franchise laws.

This model was beneficial to both manufacturers and retailers until the advent of the Information Age in the late nineteen-eighties. With the arrival of global instantaneous information sharing and online automobile sale, disintermediation occurred—that is, the role of the retailer became superfluous (or at least very much different). Cutting back on its number of dealerships has been a key means for GM to reattain profitability. [Source: Bodish]

Ruggles writes: The model is STILL beneficial to both OEMs and Retailers.

Disintermediation has NOT occurred, at least not yet. Cutting back on the number of its Dealerships was NOT a key means for GM to regain profitability. GM's customers are its Dealers. Consumer end users are the customer of their Dealers. Getting rid of customers doesn't help an auto OEM become profitable. GM realized their mistake and reinstated many of the terminated Dealers with some urging from Congress. The story behind how Team Auto came to the conclusion that reducing Dealerships helped OEM profitability is a long one. Looking through this blog one will find numerous columns on the subject. But if one wants to read the most scathing criticism of that mistaken thinking, read the SIGTARP report on the auto bailout (such as HERE).

Yesterday, Automotive News reported that Tesla Motors CEO Elon Musk (the same billionaire entrepreneur who plans to build a colony on Mars and die there himself, “just not on impact”) will “consider federal options” in his battle to overturn automobile franchise laws.

Ruggles writes: Actually, Elon Musk is NOT seeking to overturn automobile franchise law. He is looking for the means for Tesla to own its own Dealerships. This is not a problem in most states as long as there are no Tesla franchised Dealers. Musk plans to have NO privately owned franchised Dealers in any state, or so he thinks, UNTIL he realizes that expansion is limited by his own personal finances and having franchised Dealers might benefit him and his company. Personally, I have no problem with Tesla owning its own stores, and don't think anyone else should either, as long as Tesla isn't competing against any franchised Telsa dealers. But he did run afoul of the Texas auto franchise law, and that is where the legal action is taking place. Read Maryann Keller's statement about the matter in this blog.

He tweeted a link to a petition calling for the same on the White House’s website (as of this writing it had just over 5000 signatures). Musk runs Tesla Motors on a “mall-based” retail network, which dealers in Texas and elsewhere have alleged violates many states’ laws.

David Hyatt, a spokesman for the National Automobile Dealers Association, responded to this petition’s claim that franchise laws “stifle the auto industry, keep prices of new vehicles up and reduce consumer choice,” stating that “the franchise system is good for consumers, good for communities and good for the economy. Manufacturers that sell their vehicles directly to consumers – and don't let anyone else sell that vehicle – eliminate competitive pricing.”[4]

Ruggles writes: Yes, the state franchise laws stifle the auto industry to the point they have only sold as many as 17 million new vehicles in a year. So we can sell what, 20 million without Dealers? Who will deal with the tradeins and do the warranty work? If you want to see new vehicle prices rise, get rid of the franchise Dealers and leave it to the OEMs. Is anyone familiar with the Ford Collection experiment which failed miserably?

Yet allowing manufacturers to sell cars directly to the consumer could very well reduce inventory costs, and whether it does should be left to be seen. In other words, if retailing actually increases competition and lowers prices, then dealerships will survive the deregulation of the automobile franchising system.

Ruggles writes: It won't be seen any time soon. There is NO EVIDENCE that manufacturers selling directly to consumers will save inventory costs. NONE.

Now this is an arbitrary sum up. Why should the purpose be to lower prices? The mission is to let the competitive market determine prices. We're not going to see any deregulation of the automobile franchise system. Dealers have made BILLIONS of dollars of investment in their businesses based on the franchise system. The numbers are so high there is no way for OEMs to finance their own dealer network, and they know it.

the prof (Smitka) writes [originally April 23rd, 2013]: Whether dealers are “necessary” is something we’ll talk about; it’s good that you picked up the Tesla, which is attempting to circumvent state franchise law with Texas as a test case. Auto distribution was a key, probably the key, institution in the development of franchising; fast food is strictly post-WWII but as we’ll read, autos date to the 1920s. The case is much more complex than just physical distribution and inventory costs; on a regional basis swapping among dealers addresses the latter, because you can (potentially) sell cars held by others, but selling out of inventory is more profitable. However, a dealership also provides for the purchase of used cars (and then their sale), arranges finance, and handles service. “The Factory” has found that an impossible business to run as part of a large organization, and not just in the US but also in Japan, Germany, the UK and emerging markets such as China, Brazil and India. That ought to suggest that the issues are rather more complex.

So we might instead ask: what might make Tesla different? Or is this a transitional pattern (which, by the way, ties up a lot of capital)?

Bodish, Gerald R. (2009). "Economic Effects of State Bans on Direct Manufacturer Sales to Car Buyers." Department of Justice Economic Analysis Group Competition Advocacy Paper #09-1 CA.

Lafontaine, Francine and Morton, Fiona Scott (2010). “State Franchise Laws, Dealer Terminations, and the Auto Crisis.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24:3 (Summer), 233–250.

Martí, Eric, Garth Saloner, and A. Michael Spence (2000). "Disintermediation in the U.S. Auto Industry." Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Case Number: EC-10.

Maryann Keller - Recent Speech at a JD Power Conference

For the over four decades I’ve been involved with the auto industry, first as an investment analyst and now as a consultant and director serving on the boards of both automotive companies and auto dealers. Over those four decades, I’ve heard many arguments made against the franchise dealer system…which dealers never fail to disprove time and time again.

One myth promulgated in the 1990s - and now resurfaced by Tesla - is that factory stores save money by reducing distribution expenses wrongly estimated at 30% of total expense. Let’s put aside for the moment that the percentage itself is nonsense, Ford’s ill-fated Auto Collection experiment proved conclusively (as told to me by a former Ford executive last week) that corporate guys are not risk takers and lack the entrepreneurial spirit to manage dealerships. Big corporations control from the top but selling cars requires street smarts and adapting to local market and competition. Ford ended its experiment after a couple of years of market share losses amid mounting evidence that factory stores do not deliver a better customer experience nor reduce costs, in fact they proved to be bad at both. GM, perhaps after watching Ford’s travails, and despite repeating the same nonsense about reduced costs through factory ownership, canceled its plans to buy 10% of its dealers, plus the Saturn stores, and operate them in through what it called GM Retail Holdings.
Ford’s failed experiment demonstrated that, franchise laws notwithstanding, dealers are essential partners in the long process of a car’s journey from the factory to a customer’s garage. Franchise laws protect dealers from arbitrary actions by automakers and given the financial commitments they continue to make in response to factory demands in image programs, equipment, training and even vendor selection, the laws are entirely reasonable. Given the intense competition in auto retailing, it’s hard to understand how anyone could suggest that franchise laws hurt consumers.
Franchise dealers’ cumulative investment in land, equipment and facilities easily exceeds $100 billion. Dealers fund 60 days of inventory and another month of inventory in transit that would otherwise fall to the carmaker. The inventory buffer allows automakers to adjust future production levels. For a company like Ford US inventory funding equals about $15 billion at any point in time.
Tesla may be the first start up to launch a car and change the retail process as well but it is definitely not the only company that saw dealerships as a costly impediment to customer bliss. A few years ago I was involved with one such company funded by venture capitalists, and led by a non-automotive executive, that invested in a small car promising to build to order sold though mall-based stores. The car never made it to production and the company folded after consuming the investors’ capital. .
Despite evidence to the contrary and lacking any real world understanding to the business, a journalist writing on Yahoo Autos last year stated “Instead of building cars and selling them to dealers who hawk them to shoppers, Tesla wants to build only cars to customers orders, eliminating part of the auto industry’s massive overhead costs in inventory. By selling cars directly Tesla’s executives believe they can make their customer happy, and eventually sell more cars for less money.” Well we will see if it is fact is more economical for the factory to pay the rent, salaries, delivery and service or have someone else do it using his or her own capital. And build to order works only as long as there is an order bank…what happens when the orders dry up…do you send the assembly workers home, tell your suppliers to send to stop producing until you call?…..unfortunately auto assembly really doesn’t lend itself to build to order. It is capital and labor intensive even when work is farmed out to suppliers.
Every dealer knows that the vast majority of customers want their car that day not a date convenient to a manufacturer. The dealer has always been the buffer with the automaker facilitating inventory management through various incentives and production adjustments. It is the dealer who finds the market-clearing price for a vehicle even at the sacrifice of his or her profits.
Others have tried experiments in selling away from the traditional retail dealer location on the notion that a big box retailer or mall would mitigate advertising expenses by placing cars where the customers are.
Early in the 2000s, Asbury struck a deal with Walmart to sell used cars in the parking lots of Walmart stores. Asbury would take the cars to where the retail customers were at America’s busiest retailer. A few dealers have experimented (as Tesla is now doing) renting inline space in large shopping malls as storefronts to sell cars. So far, the history of non-dealership settings to sell cars – with perhaps the exception of the infrequent offsite tent sale – hasn’t worked. The Asbury/Walmart experiment ended in less than two years when both parties discovered there were too few car buyers among the static population of regular customers who shopped for food and other necessities at their local Walmart each week.
I suspect that once the novelty associated with Tesla wears off, it too will also discover that mall locations aren’t ideal places to market or sell cars. The enclosed shopping mall typically has several large anchor stores – Nordstrom, Macy’s, Neiman Marcus, etc. – and perhaps eighty to one hundred or so “in line” shops like GAP, the Limited, Zale’s, Sunglass Hut, Apple, etc. A large successful mall might have more than a million or more visitors a year – and that’s about 3,000 folks per day. Those big numbers can dazzle but they aren't what they seem. Much of this traffic represents repeat visitors, as it did at Walmart, coming each week or so to see the changing merchandise at her favorite stores – new fashion and seasonal clothing, makeup, shoes or the latest Apple gadget. Everything can be purchased on a credit card. I used the pronoun “her” deliberately because the vast majority of mall stores are dedicated to women and children not the men who would be the targets for an expensive, high tech performance car.
Furthermore, new car models are only really new only every four to six years. The merchandise doesn’t change very often – so on the second or third visit to the mall, the car store looks exactly as it did last month or even the month before. What was fresh once is now stale with the passage of time…so visitors to the mall just skip past that new car display.
What the uninformed forget – or figure out after an attempt or three – is that automotive retailing is very different from traditional retailing. The product car dealers sell is expensive, generally requires financing, and often involves a trade. It often includes helping shoppers match their budget to a car that might not be their first choice but rather one they can afford. The process is slowed by required disclosures and regulations resulting in a pile of documents that have to be signed even for the most straightforward transaction.
A car weighs 4,000 pounds and takes up 50 square feet of space. It can’t be delivered overnight to one’s front door by Fedex. And most folks don’t have a big enough credit limit on their Visa card to pay for it. And what do they do with their trade? Or get it serviced?
While we are talking about myths, how about the still repeated one that people hate dealers so, if given the chance, they will buy a car online. I almost don't know where to start in taking this one apart…..In the early days of the Internet, Silicon Valley funded and lost hundreds of millions, maybe even a billion dollars, on ill-fated ventures that promised to do just that. CarOrder.com, Greenlight.com, and CarsDirect.com (in its original configuration), among others, all promised to avoid the dealership experience. A few actually did that by buying cars from dealers and then reselling them at lower prices to customers until they blew through their capital. Build to Order.com proposed that you would place your order for a fully customized car while lounging in a company-owned showroom entertainment center. Again here the premise was to build these cars using an automaker’s parts and technology but avoiding high labor costs and dealerships and give the customer the exact car they wanted. Build-to-order.com never built anything for anyone.
In 1999 and 2000, I ran priceline.com’s experiment with selling cars online, which like most others of the era no longer exists. The essential elements of the priceline model were replicated by TrueCar.com and of course they too ran afoul of franchise laws for the same reasons as priceline. What I learned then – and this is still true today – we could connect buyers with dealers and that the price of a vehicle was the easiest part of a deal. The other elements are harder to control and often the cause of frustration for the customer and the dealer. People don’t like to hear that their trade isn’t worth the value they saw online or that their poor credit doesn’t qualify them for the no down payment, zero percent loan. There are few people who would think about buying a house online from a few photos taken make rooms seem larger than they are or the neighbors Beware of dog sign. Buying a car is comparable to buying a house, why should we think it should be as easy as buying a pair of shoes from Zappos with a return receipt in the box in case they don’t fit.
Although many automotive websites claim to have “sold” millions cars, even today twelve years after priceline decided to concentrate exclusively on travel, automotive websites link a buyer to a dealer who actually sells the car. The Internet has mostly replaced the newspaper as a source of information about cars and dealers but it has not reduced advertising expense per vehicle or made buying a car as easy as buying a book.
Add up all the monthly traffic to all automotive sites, including automakers, dealers and independent sites – and you’d get more than 100 million possibly close to 200 million unique visitors using the web to get information about buying or selling a new or used car. Except there’s one problem if this traffic is somehow suppose to represent potential sales…the total number of new and used cars sold by dealers at retail and excluding fleet each month is only about two million units, and that is probably generous given that not all retail customers go online..some might just release the same brand of the leased car they are returning to the dealer. So the real shoppers – however you want to define that number – are only a small fraction of the total visitors. So just like newspaper, radio, or TV advertising, dealer spend on the internet is likely no better targeted – once again dispelling the notion that the internet would solve the age-old problem of knowing which 50% of a dealer’s advertising works.
And what was once promised as to the beauty of the Internet for used cars…listings of available cars with pictures, even videos, and stated pricing would make it easy for shoppers to find the best car at the best price. But what has happened is that for any given vehicle, within a similar bandwidth of age, mileage, trim, the price range for specific models is usually within a few hundred dollars, not enough to make price the deciding purchase factor. The Internet hasn’t created a pricing advantage for any seller and customers simply have confirmation that similar cars within a market are priced the same. With the exception of hard to find cars, the differentiating factors are having the car the customer wants, proximity of the dealership and the dealer’s reputation in providing a good customer experience.
In summary, technology is a wonderful thing…and dealers have adopted it nearly full tilt. Sophisticated software to manage every aspect of the business is now de riguer…BDC’s to support internet sales…and eDocuments will eventually become the norm. But the point is that the system of franchised dealers – using their own risk capital to fund their businesses and guarantee millions of dollars of inventory, promote their own brand and that of their OEM, provide the expensive tools needed in their service departments, and manage the endless headache of a workforce – will not be superseded by technology or factory owned mall stores. Factories have learned that they cannot do a better job than independent businessmen at the retail level. And new start ups – many of whom will come and go – with new systems of selling and servicing retail automobiles will all reach the same conclusion: the dealer network is the best way. Thank you for listening today.

















Tuesday, 18 June 2013

Maryann Keller Testimonay RE: Tesla versus the state of Texas


Considerations for the State of Texas
Consumer Benefits of the Independent versus Factory-owned New Car Retailer
April 9, 2013
My name is Maryann Keller. I am the Managing Partner of Maryann Keller & Associates LLC, a management consulting firm specializing in the automotive industry. I have served in this position for more than twelve years. My firm is and has been engaged on a wide variety of consulting projects for clients including automotive OEMs, lenders, private equity firms, government agencies, and retailers. Several law firms and one US government agency have engaged me to provide expert witness testimony in support of litigation. I have never served as an expert witness in any litigation involving or related to auto retailing or auto dealers.
I currently serve as a Director on the Boards of two companies. The first is a privately-owned franchise new car dealership group in the State of Maine, and the second is for Drivetime Automotive, a privately-held multi-state automotive retailer specializing in providing subprime credit customers with affordable transportation. At various times in the last twelve years, I have served on the Boards of several public companies including Sonic Automotive and Lithia Motors, both multi-state franchised dealership operators, and for Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, a rental car agency. Prior to starting my own firm, I was President of priceline.com’s automotive services division during 1999-2000. That start up operation was essentially a sophisticated lead generation process that matched online shoppers of new cars to franchised dealers.

Before my employment at priceline.com, I worked as an automotive industry analyst on Wall Street for 28 years. I served as Chairman of the Society of Automotive Analysts from 1994-1999. During my Wall Street tenure, I was ranked as an All-Star Analyst 12 times by Institutional Investor magazine. I have authored two books on the industry. My first bookRude Awakening: The Rise, Fall and Struggle to Recover at General Motors, was published in 1989 and received the prestigious George S. Eccles prize for Excellence in Economic Writing from Columbia University. My second book, published in 1993, is entitled Collision: GM, Toyota, and Volkswagen and the Race to Own the Twenty-first Century.
The Texas Auto Dealers Association asked me to submit my comments for your consideration as to the benefits of the franchised dealer system for consumers. I can unequivocally state that the consumer is best served by the franchise dealership system for the reasons elaborated herein. My opinions are based upon my four decades of involvement with the automotive industry, particularly within the United States, during which time I have witnessed challenges to the franchised dealer model, including a somewhat recent experiment by Ford that proved both the value and superiority of the franchise dealership over a factory–owned store.
All too often the debate about what is the better retail solution of the car buyer is couched in vague goals: lower distribution costs, more control over the ownership experience, consistent experience in every store, etc. But this ignores the actual car purchase and ownership experience for the vast majority of new car buyers who acquire a new car every four to six years and in doing so links him or herself to the dealer expecting that dealer to resolve all repair issues, manage recalls and warranty claims, and be their advocate in resolving issues with the manufacturer.
Buying a car is not akin to shopping at Target, Wal-Mart, or Tiffany where the transaction is paid by credit card and requires no further relationship with the seller. Buying a new car is a thoughtful process often involving months of online research and visits to multiple dealerships to test drive vehicles under consideration. Even with the enormous amount of easily accessible information on the characteristics and features of every make and model, retail and invoice pricing, projected residual values, quality ratings etc., the process is different. With a new vehicle, most customers are making significant emotional and investment decisions which require assistance in obtaining new financing and disposal of an existing vehicle often including extinguishment of associated debt. The new car purchase experience is far removed from any other retail purchase as to the unique needs of every shopper and the regulatory and disclosure requirements for each sale.
Further, the customer relationship with any new vehicle (and some used vehicles which offer extended manufacturer warranties) and the selling entity – a new car dealer – extends well beyond the initial acquisition. There are elements of warranty repair, manufacturer recalls (from time to time), and even silent recalls which are addressed at service visits. Warranty periods are generally at least three years in length (subject to mileage limits) or longer with some components, such as powertrain, emissions and occupant safety systems, having manufacturer warranty coverage over an even longer period. Warranty and recalls are exclusively handled only by dealers authorized to represent the manufacturer. And for lease customers, one end-of-lease option includes returning the vehicle to manufacturer’s captive fiancé company or other lender through its dealer network. It is also interesting to note that while General Motors, Ford and others have abandoned some brands in recent years, the remaining franchised dealers were designated to perform the above required functions for the owners of Oldsmobiles, Saturns, Hummers, Pontiacs and Mercurys.
There is a strong consumer interest in having independently-owned dealerships acting on behalf of the manufacturers. The primary reasons result from the following:
  1. Desire by the independent dealer to find a solution that best meets the transportation requirements for all customers regardless of income, creditworthiness, available cash, or trade value;
  2. Competition among dealers drives product and service pricing to a true market level and offers the consumer a choice among vendors; and
  3. Value preservation for both the manufacturer’s brand and dealer’s brand drives behavior to seek customer satisfaction with the dealer acting as in intermediary between the manufacturer and the consumer.
It should be understood that the franchised dealership, an entity owned and operated by a business separate and distinct from the vehicle manufacturer, is nonetheless a franchisee. As such, the franchisee is granted specific rights to utilize certain marks of the manufacturer, sell and service the manufacturer’s products, and engage in a limited number of other ancillary activities such as used car sales, car rental, and other related automotive services. However, the franchisee is not given an unlimited license and must conform to the standards and practices set forth by the manufacturer in order to retain the franchise rights. This can include investing in store image programs, adding service bays, personnel and service hours to accommodate local needs, purchasing specialized tools, investing in continuous training levels of sales and service personnel, meeting specific levels of customer satisfaction based upon manufacturer surveys of every buyer and service customer, and acting in a manner appropriate to maintain the general goodwill of the manufacturer and the brands represented.
As such, the dealer – as the franchisee – must conform to the standards expected by the franchisee. Yet, unlike other franchise systems such as McDonalds or 7-11, the automotive dealer also has his own local, regional, or even nationwide brand to support and maintain. In this manner, the dealer acts as both a “system operator” selling and servicing an automotive brand for a manufacturer but also on his own behalf to support his or her own brand. Think of the local car dealers in your districts. You likely do not think of them as just the “Ford” or “Nissan” store but that of “John Doe Ford” or “Jane Doe Nissan” owned and operated by businesses distinct from their manufacturers. They and their employees are members of the community where they continue to represent the automaker’s brand as well as their own.
This is a singularly different element of the franchised automotive dealer system as opposed to most other franchise businesses. No one goes to a McDonalds or a Fairfield Inn and cares who the actual owner might be – the reputation is solely that of the franchisor. The nature of their products and services are such that there is little variance, if any, among franchisees, the product or service is rapidly consumed (and at relatively low cost), and there is no long term on-going relationship of daily use.
Any new car though is expensive, has a long duration ownership cycle, and warranty claims can only be satisfied at a franchised dealer. The relationship with a new car dealer extends well beyond the initial purchase, and maintaining customer satisfaction with the vehicle becomes not only the responsibility of the manufacturer but that of the local dealership as well, even if different from that where the vehicle was purchased. Hence, new car dealers are different from other franchise operators in that there is usually a name attached to the franchise brand that is promoted, advertised, and carries its own reputation separate and distinct from the vehicle brand. Hence, the new car dealer actually serves two masters – that of his manufacturer and that of his or her own creation.
This distinction is extremely important for one reason: the dealer’s desire to maintain his or her own reputation serves as the buffer between the customer and the manufacturer. It is in the dealer’s interest to ensure the complete satisfaction of the customer during the duration of vehicle ownership – and this may involve satisfaction of warranty claims, policy work as goodwill from time to time (for vehicles out of warranty), and expeditious handling of recalls and technical service bulletins as they arise. The franchised dealer often can be the advocate for the consumer with regard to issues that may be a result of action (or inaction) by the manufacturer to provide redress.
Second, the franchised dealer network – among any given brand – provides choices for the customer as to both sales and service. While different brands compete for customers, within a given brand, a consumer can pick and choose among different dealers offering the exact same products and services. So price competition exists between not only different vehicle companies (e.g., Chevrolet versus Toyota) but between dealers within the same brand as well. The vast majority of new car purchases are done in major metropolitan regions. Here, shoppers generally have access to several dealers of the same brand within a 25 mile radius who compete with each other and while providing convenient access to service without forcing the owner to drive long distances for repairs.
Competition permits true price discovery by consumers for the best deal among different brands. But such competition also exists among the dealers of any specific brand to promote their best deals. Thus, dealers provide a service to all shoppers that may see such promotions – and hence force competing dealers to respond. Here again, the consumer is served by independently-owned franchisees competing for business from consumers in a local market. Likewise with service, dealers compete for such business and drive prices to a market level as consumers have a choice.
I note that while all new vehicles are required by federal law to display a Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price, the reality is that most new vehicles are sold at prices somewhat below the suggested price. Further, the actual market pricing for a given vehicle can vary among markets for a number of different reasons – changes in local demand associated with local economies, regional manufacturer incentives, equipment match (or mismatch) with regional needs and desires, excess or insufficient inventory stock, or simply response to new models from competing brands at the local level. With so many variables in the dynamic automobile marketplace no company or dealer can fix a price over long periods of time. The presence of competing dealerships allows this market-based pricing to occur among brands, models and among dealers.
Third, the franchised dealer system has generally served customers very well. Everyone who wants to buy a vehicle – a necessity for many – is generally accommodated in some fashion. For new and used car buyers, the franchised dealer provides the inventory and financing to provide transportation for many even if means offering an alternative to a new car purchase for some. But as independent businesses, the franchised dealer owns his inventory of new and used cars. There are often hundreds of vehicles available sale – which gives customers same day access to transportation. Because such inventory is owned by the dealer – there is a strong incentive for the dealer to make sure that each and every customer can be satisfied. Once again, the consumer benefits from broad selection, immediate availability, and the on-site services the dealer provides to take trades and arrange financing for the customer.
Furthermore there is no evidence that the vast majority of car buyers are willing to wait weeks or months for a build to order vehicle. The purchase of a new car is often prompted by a life changing event: a new job, relocation to the another city, a move to a new home, the birth of a child, marriage, divorce, a death in the family, or an accident rendering the car a total loss or resulting in high repair costs. We know that the shopping process can begin months before the actual purchase, but once the decision has been made the customer wants the car as soon as possible. The franchised dealer, with his inventory, is generally able to accommodate every customer’s needs and pocketbook. Even if a dealer doesn’t have the exact car in stock, the dealer is generally able to find and deliver that exact car the customer desires within a couple of days. This past October, my sister, having just moved to CT from AZ, decided prior to her move to purchase a specific make and model. I accompanied her and my brother in law to the dealer where they settled on the trim level and color they wanted which this dealer didn’t have in stock. My sister needed a car quickly and couldn’t wait for the next factory shipment. However, within ten minutes, the dealer located the exact vehicle 60 miles away in New Jersey and arranged with the NJ dealer to flat bed the car to CT the next day. Within 48 hours of entering the CT dealership for the first time, she and her husband drove out of the store with their desired vehicle.
One of the arguments made by vehicle manufacturers seeking to control both distribution and service can generally be described as follows:
We can offer a compelling customer experience while achieving operating efficiencies and capturing sales and service revenues incumbent automobile manufacturers do not enjoy in the traditional franchised distribution and service model. Our customers deal directly with our own factory-employed sales and service staff, creating what we believe is a superior buying experience from the buying experience consumers have with franchised automobile dealers and service centers. We believe we will also be able to better control costs of inventory, manage warranty service and pricing, maintain and strengthen our brand, and obtain rapid customer feedback. Further, we believe that by owning our sales network we will avoid the conflict of interest in the traditional dealership structure inherent to most incumbent automobile manufacturers where the sale of warranty parts and repairs by a dealer are a key source of revenue and profit for the dealer but often are an expense for the vehicle manufacturer.
The fundamental problem with this argument is that the consumer has no choice but to deal with the factory itself for both sales and service. There is no opportunity for price discovery by consumers for a new car or for service as there is no competition among stores and service centers all are owned by the factory. All new cars are priced as set by the factory – and not determined by the marketplace among competing sellers. Second, the factory also determines service rates, parts costs, and makes its own determination as to whether a claim is valid for warranty coverage. There is no independent arbitrator that can act on behalf of the consumer as in the case of the independent franchised dealer system. And last, the factory owned store has little impetus to accommodate customers that cannot afford their new vehicles – in contrast to the franchised dealer which has a strong motivation to satisfy each and every customer with a transportation solution.
There is yet another problem with the factory-owned model of distribution and service. Since the factory controls both the parts supply as well as the technical training for the mechanics, there is little impetus for the factory to provide such to independent third party agencies. In effect, the factory service locations and its own mechanics (whether based at a service center or delivered through mobile repair trucks) forces all customers to utilize its labor and needed parts at prices it solely determines. The customer is effectively trapped within the network solely controlled by the vehicle manufacturer.
This is in contrast to the franchised dealer system where a customer can access parts and labor among competing independently owned service centers – at prices that are determined by the market. Further, franchised dealers also sell factory original parts to vehicle owners, independent mechanics, and even to other dealers. Some franchised dealers have large wholesale parts inventories and supply factory parts to various professional buyers, thus supplementing the manufacturer’s own parts distribution system. In contrast, the factory-owned store system, as a sole source, has no incentive to do so in order to maximize its own revenues and eliminate potential competitors from servicing its vehicles. Again, not only are customers deprived of the right to shop for the best service price (and experience) but other third parties – such as independent mechanics or other dealers – are deprived of the right to service and support vehicles sold and serviced only by the factory.
Last, there is no inherent conflict between the factory and the franchised dealer with regard to warranty and service. It is true that warranty work can generate a profit for the dealer – and the desire to provide warranty service is a motivator, not detraction for such independent dealers as it is a solution which optimizes customer satisfaction. In the factory-centric model, as a single source provider of service, such motivation to supply and support warranty service becomes diminished as it is only a cost to the factory, not a revenue stream.
There is a notion that factory stores eliminate costs in the factory-owned distribution system that can be passed on to consumers. It is easy to find essays written by uninformed professors on the topic that have helped to perpetuate this notion. One has to ask exactly where those savings might arise. It is also merely hypothetical to assume that the automaker would be altruistic and pass any “realized” savings on the consumer.
There are certainly no savings in fixed assets such as the dealerships land, buildings, or equipment. Nor would there be a reduction in employees. Variable costs such as advertising would remain unchanged. So the question is whether there would be savings in inventory. The “build to order” model remains a theoretical ideal. Currently auto companies are paid immediately for their output by their dealers. Each dealer is then obligated to find the market clearing price for vehicles in high demand as well as models that might be at the end of the production cycle facing intense competition and requiring heavy discounting.
Auto assembly is capital intensive which requires large facilities and skilled workforces. It is called auto assembly because vehicles are assembled from parts and components produced by suppliers that fabricate them in equally capital and labor intensive production plants. Parts producers bid contracts based upon annual production volume targets. They make investments to support projected volumes. Neither the supplier community nor the automakers themselves can rely upon a fixed price retail model based on “build to order” as a way to manage or reduce costs. For both assembler and parts suppliers steady output above breakeven optimizes profits. Stop start production raises unit costs because of the high fixed costs associated these factories. Every product has a life cycle whether an Apple iPhone or Chevrolet Silverado. Demand for individual products varies not only because of macro economic factors but also competition. So to assume that there are savings from a perpetual order bank is simply not credible or supported over the long term even by models like Dell Computer. Dell Computer’s build to order model worked as long as there was no iPAd.
Both GM and Ford experimented with factory ownership of retail stores during the late 1990s. Ford’s ill-fated Auto Collection experiment proved conclusively that factory ownership did not work well. Ford ended its experiment after a couple of years of market share losses amid mounting evidence that its factory stores did not deliver a better customer experience nor reduce costs. GM, perhaps after watching Ford’s travails, and despite repeating the same nonsense about reduced costs through factory ownership, canceled its own planned takeover of 10% of its franchised dealers.
In summary, the independent franchised dealer system does provide the best solution for consumers for the reasons elaborated above. Of course, I recognize that the franchised system is not perfect – and there are and will always be a few dealers which do not provide high levels of customer satisfaction. Yet the franchise system has survived for over 100 years and best serves customer needs.

























Thursday, 23 May 2013

Tesla's Distribution Challenge

...the issue isn't whether Tesla's distribution approach is legal, it's whether it's sensible...
Tesla is distributing its battery electric cars directly, rather than through franchised dealers. That's raised a hulabaloo from NADA and dealers about legality. Texas is one large market in which Tesla may be stymied for several years; its attempt to get legislation that would permit direct sales is dead this legislative season, and the next session isn't for two years, until 2015. Barring judicial support, that's a long wait in a large market. There may be room to do so, since the firm has no franchised dealers in any state, hence the idea that it is undermining dealers protected by franchise agreements has no merit. Be that as it may, taking the issue to the courts takes time, and Tesla would like to become a volume manufacturer sooner rather than much later. Time will tell, but time is not in their favor.
The real issue, however, isn't whether Tesla's distribution approach is legal, it's whether it's sensible. In his visit to Lexington to speak to my Economics 244 students, David Ruggles posited that it's ultimately unworkable. Let me make a few points in that direction; interested readers might find the Dicke chapter cited below of interest, and hopefully David will add his thoughts.
    1. For a firm seeking to expand, dealerships are the cheapest available source of finance. We can ignore the up-front fees to purchase franchise rights (at issue in the failed attempt of Mahindra & Mahindra – or maybe primarily the serial entrepreneur Malcolm Bricklin – to set up a dealerships to sell trucks imported from India). That's really small stuff, from the perspective of the financial needs of a car assembler. Much more important is that a dealership pays for new vehicle inventory, signage and replacement parts inventory and provides the necessary real estate. That is a crucial source of working capital for a manufacturer, because the factory is paid cash when a car rolls off the assembly line, whereas parts suppliers are paid a month or three (and workers a week or two) in arrears. Remember, too, that dealerships frequently hold two month's of inventory. Under its current structure Tesla will need to fund that directly.
    2. It may not be a big issue when they restrict themselves to a low volume of hand-assembled cars. It won't be trivial when they want to run a proper assembly operation.
    1. Moving to volume business will also require making provision for repairs. That may not be a big issue when its market is limited to a handful of states and is of high-end cars. They and their cars' owners can wait for a technician to be dispatched, or the car transported. That won't work if they want to move away from the supercar end of the market, because their vehicles will be means of transport, not playthings. Would-be purchasers won't want to wait a week or more to get a problem looked at. I think Tesla underestimates the challenge (cost!) of directly developing a dense network of repair facilities.
    2. In the old days, the local mechanic could do the actual work. But as Kevin Borg (a historian of the independent service station at James Madison University in Virginia) emphasizes in recent work, even the most skilled of independent service technicians lacks the training and equipment for working with the computers and high-voltage electrical systems of a vehicle such as a Tesla. To put it simply, they are fundamentally mechanics, experts in traditional mechanical systems, and a Tesla lacks much of the appurtances of an internal combustion engine powered vehicle.
    1. Historically the "factory" has been abyssmal at controlling inventory and even worse at handling tradeins. Think of Ford's disastrous attempt [1998-2001] under Jacques Nasser at Ford to buy up independent dealers and run their stores directly in several markets where state franchise law allowed direct sales (eg, Oklahoma City). Dicke's history of the early days of automotive distribution tells the same story. The bottom line is that the factory bleeds, and the longer it tries, the more money it loses.
    2. Now the rise of multistore dealership groups suggests that at least some people have figured out how to run stores under hired general managers rather than owner-operators. So maybe there is more know-how available. However, such dealership groups – the AutoNation and Penske's of the world – still account for but a small share of total US vehicle sales. I remain skeptical.
Ford in its early days had time to experiment; it wasn't until the early 1920s, after DuPont took over GM, that Ford faced a serious rival. They had time to recover from mis-steps. Tesla won't have that luxury.
...mike smitka...
Dicke, Thomas S. (1992). “From Agent to Dealer: The Ford Motor Company, 1903-1956.” In: Franchising in America: The Development of a Business method, 1840-1980. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, Chapter 2, pp. 48-84.